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ECOLOGICAL LIBERTARIANISM:  




 The field of environmental political theory has made great gains in its relatively short 
existence as an academic discipline. One area in which these advancements can be noticed is the 
strong discussion surrounding the foundations, institutions, and processes of Western liberalism 
and the relationship of these elements to issues of environmentalism. Within this discussion has 
manifested the bedrock assumption that the underlying components of classical liberalism – 
namely individualism, negative liberties, and instrumental rationality – preclude or greatly hinder 
progress toward securing collective environmental needs. This assumption has great intuitive 
strength as well as exhibition in liberal democracies such as the United States. However, in using 
this assumption as a launchpad for reconsidering elements of liberalism, scholars have 
inadvertently closed alternate routes of analysis and theorization. This thesis aims to explore one 
such alternate route.  
 Libertarianism, the contemporary reincarnation of classical liberalism, has been generally 
disregarded in policy and academic realms due to its stringent and inflexible adherence to self-
interest, instrumental rationality, and individualism; in discussions of environment, these 
complaints are only augmented. These criticisms have been validated by a libertarian scholarship 
that emphasized nature as a warehouse of resources specifically suited for human use. But from 




investigation through its overarching research question: can nonhumans have self-ownership 
within libertarian theory, and what would that mean for libertarian theory? 
 Part I of the thesis introduces us to the foundation, tenants, and overall logical structure 
of contemporary libertarian theory. Finding autonomy to be the key to moral standing, and 
finding autonomy to be a contested criterion, we discover the shaky ground on which the totality 
of libertarianism stands. After identifying the relationship of libertarianism and the environment 
– one of atomistic, instrumental, and anthropocentric utilization – we connect the current non-
standing moral status of nonhumans in libertarian theory directly to criteria of autonomy. With 
autonomy acknowledged as a contested subject, we thus arrive at the conclusion that the lack of 
moral status awarded to nonhumans has arisen not through logical derivation but the reification 
of tradition. With libertarianism itself a theory set opposed to the rule of tradition, and with 
libertarianism’s strength residing in its logical consistency across issue areas, we thus find 
immediate need for the consideration of the criteria of autonomy. After addressing some 
potential criticisms and academic linkages, we set about this normative investigation. 
 Part II centers on the establishment of a proper framework for the task of evaluating 
libertarianism’s main criteria of autonomy. This framework is grounded foremost in the 
recognition of the inherent social embeddedness within libertarian theory; this embeddedness is 
founded in the necessary reciprocation of liberty protections through the principles of non-
aggression and non-interference and, while acknowledged by libertarian theorists, remained a 
largely undernourished portion of libertarian theory. To counter anthropocentric bias – in effort 
to ward off the influence of tradition – additional ecological criteria are added to this framework, 
culminating in an open, non-anthropocentric framework. Afterward, the chapter examines the 




discussion finalizes our analytic framework by emphasizing the practical importance of moral 
reasoning.  
 Part III sets about the task of examining the criteria of autonomy utilized within 
libertarian theory. Two conceptions of autonomy – minimalist and prudentialist – are defined, 
with discussion showing libertarianism to rely, inherently and explicitly, on prudentialist forms 
of autonomy. The two primary criteria of prudentialism used, life-planning and reason, are then 
analyzed in turn; this analysis manifests the critique that in the practical usage of morality both 
criteria rely on and collapse into minimalism. Prudentialism as a standard is then examined to 
show its paradoxical reliance on pre-formulated conceptions of human lives, to the detriment of 
logical consistency and the virtues of negative liberty. Singer’s criterion of suffering is then 
briefly examined, with discussion outlining its inapplicability within libertarian theory. 
Narveson’s question of the moral egoist completes the chapter, with the linkage between 
nonhuman domination and human domination solidifying the argument that full nonhuman 
moral standing will reduce both to the advantage of libertarian society. From these critiques, 
then, we observe the critical failure of prudentialism to hold in praxis and see minimalist 
autonomy as the necessary foundation for libertarian theory.  
 Part IV outlines some consequences of minimalist autonomy within libertarian theory. 
The questions of reciprocity and nonhuman violence are examined, with discussions of 
complications and critiques following. These complications comprise the intersection of 
ecological libertarianism with extant issues within libertarian theory, such as Nozick’s Principle 
of Rectification, the moral allowance of self-defense, and the question of the moral standing of 
children. Afterward, the broader conversation is considered along with specific consideration of 




future theorizing are opened – namely the conceptualization of nonhuman labor and nonhuman 
property rights – for future critical investigation.  
 Through this thesis, libertarianism is shown to inherently rely on a dichotomous 
separation of humans and nonhumans that is not derived from libertarian logic but from reified 
tradition. Rejecting tradition as a suitable foundation, this thesis demonstrates the critical 
inapplicability of prudentialist autonomy within libertarian theory and the necessary reliance on 
minimalist autonomy. From this realignment we find not only greater consistency in libertarian 
logic but also a path toward to the inevitable goal of a libertarian society characterized by a lack 
of domination. Additionally, this thesis demonstrates a unique way in which libertarianism – and 
liberalism more broadly – can incorporate individual negative liberties as a means of protecting 
environmental agents; from this, the assumption of libertarianism and liberalism’s 
incompatibility with environmental causes can be recast as an accident of tradition rather than an 
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Justice for a Possum 
 
“How would you feel if you killed an innocent duck and let a vicious goose waddle free?”  
– Leslie Knope 
 
Justice is many things, the origins, substance, and application of which manifest in myriad and 
variegated forms within political theory. While Western political theorists have formulated 
motley theories of justice, a common tradition of dividing humans and nonhumans pervades 
these otherwise profoundly polar conceptions of justice. This human/nonhuman dichotomy is 
present throughout Western political thought, with only recent advancements in scientific 
understanding and political theorizing questioning this longstanding division. Recently, these 
advancements have taken to questioning this division within liberal political theories; yet the 
rapid emergence of environmentalism and political ecology in the past several decades, and the 
accompanying alteration or reinterpretation of judicial theories, has largely neglected to impact 
meaningfully the structure and logic of libertarian political theory. With libertarianism 
representing an overbearing, if not radical, acceptance of classical liberalist principles in the 
modern age, it seems awkward for ecological considerations to stop short of libertarian analysis; 
If modern scholars1 feel comfortable examining components of liberalism with an 
environmentalist lens, why do they turn from examining the most foundational of components as 
                                                
 
1 For examples of scholars examining environmental issues and liberalism, see Avner de-Shalit, The Environment: 
Between Theory and Practice (United States of America: Oxford University Press, 2000); Marcel Wissenburg, 
“Sustainability and the Limits of Liberalism,” in Debating the Earth: The Environmental Politics Reader, eds. John 
S. Dryzek and David Schlosberg, 163-190 (United States of America: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2005); and 
Robyn Eckersley, The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty (United States of America: 




displayed within libertarianism? Wissenburg, in a seminal conference paper, recently began this 
herculean task, providing a summation of the libertarianism-environment relationship and the 
components of such a relationship;2 however, he leaves innumerous questions unanswered and, 
perhaps more importantly, leaves uncertain the modes by which such conversation should be 
engaged and the potentialities of such a conversation. This project aims to continue and expand 
the conversation began by Wissenburg. It is my hope that such questions will invigorate further 
deliberation for libertarian theorists, environmentally focused political scholars, and the everyday 
libertarian individual.  
 The subtitle of this project construes directly the central question examined: can 
nonhumans possess self-ownership within libertarian theory? As we shall see in Part III, many 
libertarian scholars answer negatively, and on similar grounds. Self-ownership is the cornerstone 
of most liberal theories of justice, and is a definitive requisite for consideration of moral claims 
within libertarian conceptions of justice. The practical implications of such a potential, of 
nonhuman self-ownership, are interestingly demonstrated through an episode of the popular 
television show Parks and Recreation.  
 In “The Possum,”3 protagonist Leslie heads a task force mandated to catch a notable 
possum, “Fairway Frank,” after the mayor’s dog was attacked on a public golf course. After 
capturing a possum, Leslie discovers additional possums living within the same area and 
becomes uncertain of the captured possum’s identity and guilt. Thereafter Leslie struggles with 
moral contemplation; repeated interactions with others – who largely support killing whatever 
                                                
 
2 Marcel Wissenburg, “The Concept of Nature in Libertarianism” (conference paper, Annual Conference of the 
Dutch and Flemish Political Science Associations, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, June 9-10, 2011). 





possum was captured – cause Leslie to question her conception of justice and her morality. “Am 
I a murderer?” she asks, considering the implications of surrendering the innocent possum to 
animal control. After demonstrating the incapability of anyone to properly identify “Fairway 
Frank,” Leslie’s dilemma intensifies – she “can’t kill it because it could be innocent” but also 
“can’t free it because it could be guilty.” After researching similar instances of human-nonhuman 
judicial interactions – including a story of a duck killed due to attacks committed by a goose, 
from which this chapter’s opening quote arises – Leslie reaffirms her commitment to justice and, 
deciding against either freeing or killing the possum, gifts the possum to a local zoo. It can be 
noted that Leslie is not a libertarian, either self-avowed or externally acknowledged, and thus did 
not utilize a libertarian logic in her decision-making. However, the assumption of nonhuman 
self-ownership exuded by Leslie demonstrates accurately the new mentalities, interactions, and 
challenges which arise from acknowledging nonhumans to hold claims to justice – claims 
founded in self-ownership and individuality, the core principles of prominent Western liberal 
justice theories and libertarianism.  
 Readers aware of animal rights literature could recognize the preceding example as a 
reworking of the “goring ox” question as detailed by Steven M. Wise. A legal scholar focusing 
on nonhuman legal rights, Wise recounts the historical significance of the goring ox question 
throughout Western philosophical-legal thought and practice.4 A rough description of the 
question would provide the following information: It is several thousand years ago. A farmer 
owns an ox. The farmer walks the ox from the field toward the barn when lightening spooks the 
ox, leading it to run from the farmer. A stranger runs toward the ox – attempting to calm her and 
                                                
 




return her to the farmer. Still frightened, the ox gores the stranger and, afterward, returns to the 
barn. The stranger bleeds to death and the farmer contacts the authorities. When the authorities 
arrive the question naturally arises of what justice means in this context. Should the ox be killed? 
Should the farmer be liable? Should it be considered an accident, with no liabilities? The 
possible judicial framings are numerous. Wise follows history’s intriguing responses to this 
scenario, and positions the legal codes of the Mesopotamians and Israelites as the main rivals – 
Mesopotamians, with a quasi-modern focus on economics, answered that the farmer must 
compensate the stranger’s family for their loss; Israelites demanded the stoning of the ox and 
potentially of the farmer.5 The principle difference between these societies, in this legal-
philosophical context, was the perceived correct placement of man within nature, and the 
consequences of that placement. For Mesopotamians considered man an additional piece of 
nature, not hierarchically superior but qualitatively different, while the Israelites saw the world 
as crafted specifically for humans.6 Thus, the former society found the damages from the goring 
ox as needing reparations, but not as an affront to its ontology. The Israelites, conversely, saw 
the goring ox as an affront to the Great Chain of Being – the “natural” hierarchy of species which 
mirrors God’s intended relationships – and thus demanded the unyielding ox to be stoned and 
uneaten. While these societal interpretations of man’s placement within nature are interesting, 
and lend incredible clarity to modern legal considerations (the purpose of Wise’s discussion) we 
are, at this time, not greatly interested in the specifics of these ontologies. Rather, what we seek 
is an understanding of how a modern libertarian, adhering stringently to her principles, would 
                                                
 
5 Ibid, 27-29.  
6 We can see this juxtaposition as demonstrating generally the philosophical difference between metaphysical 




answer the question of the goring ox. Libertarians are economically inclined, and the astute 
observer is correct in acknowledging the perceived supremacy of economic concerns within the 
libertarian mind; indeed, most exposure to libertarian ideology comes in response or anticipation 
of socio-economic policies.7 But such is a misleading perception of libertarian theory – a 
common perception, shared even by self-avowed libertarians, but a misleading perception 
nonetheless. For beneath the economic rights and considerations of libertarian philosophy lie the 
requisite principles for identifying and protecting individuals within the moral community; this is 
a necessary first-step in the logical line to widespread property rights. And yet, when examining 
the foundational principles of libertarianism, as we will in the next section, the realization 
emerges that libertarian theory lacks a logically consistent foundation. Moreover, it can be seen 
that the apparent economic preoccupation of libertarians merely reflects widespread agreement 
on base assumptions, which logically build into a libertarian worldview: a view dominated by 
rational human interests, human-human interactions, and property-driven justice to facilitate such 
interests and interactions. However, as we will see from the next section, this traditional 
libertarian worldview rests on highly shaky grounds; the categorical separation of humans and 
nonhumans, and the subsequent dismissal of the latter’s interests and interactions, remains for 
libertarians founded in loose conceptions of Man and nature which neglect critical reflection and 
point to such categorical separation as a remnant of social tradition. And so, the modern 
libertarian’s answer to the goring ox question is inherently flawed by his failure to address the 
arbitrariness within his own theory of justice. I say this without identifying his actual choice to 
illustrate the severe impact such arbitrariness heralds for libertarian ontology and justice. Before 
                                                
 




considering the aptness of the libertarian’s answer, we must first ensure such an answer arises 
from rational foundations and rational processes. Hence, at its core, this project encapsulates an 
imminent critique of libertarianism, its cosmology, and the judicial outpourings which otherwise 
rationally manifest.  Tersely, then, we need the libertarian to consider the foundational criteria 
upon which his rational conception of justice is built before acknowledging his answer to the 
goring ox question as valid. Leslie saw her captured possum as an individual, possessing 
individual judicial claims and (to some unknown degree) rights. The question in lay terms, then, 
is if any divergence exists between Leslie’s acceptance of nonhuman self-ownership and the 
libertarian judicial logic; Leslie sees the possum as an individual – why should a theory of justice 
derived from radical acceptance of individualism and individual rights differ, and how could it 
differ? The goring ox question requires, before consideration of appropriate justice, the definition 
of the actors involved in the situation and their cosmological relationship to one another.  
 To begin this task, the remainder of this chapter will examine the foundational precepts 
of libertarian political theory, discuss the relationship of libertarianism to the environment, and 
identify the constraints and relevance of this project. In Part II, we will examine the inherent 
social embeddedness of libertarianism along with ecological conditions that limit anthropocentric 
bias and mandate a reconsideration of the human/nonhuman dichotomy. We will then consider 
outlets of prudential autonomy within libertarianism in light of our ecological conditions, 
identify the critical flaws of prudentialism, and select minimalism as the necessary foundation 
for ecological libertarianism in Part III. Part IV will attempt a rough sketch of what an 
ecologically conscious libertarian political theory would comprise. With these analytic pieces 
culminate the hope that modern libertarians begin a serious dialogue concerning the theoretical 




Libertarian Foundations  
 Libertarianism is a child of classical liberalism; libertarianism’s heavy focus on 
individualism, noninterference, and markets demonstrates this genetic connection. However, the 
child’s intense, unrelenting focus on personal liberty distinguishes her from other liberal 
descendants and, indeed, marks libertarianism as a distinct category of classical liberalist theory.8 
Bordering on anarchism,9 libertarianism argues for unperturbed individualism – a search for a 
Rawlsian conception of the good unmolested by foreign actors and actions. Nozick describes this 
ideal, arguing that for libertarians 
...no moral balancing act can take place among us; there is no moral outweighing 
of  one our lives by others so as to lead to a greater overall social good. There is 
no justified sacrifice of some of us for others.10 
 
Thus, the ontological lens of libertarianism always focuses upon the individual; this separation of 
individuals formulates the “root idea” of libertarianism.11 The prominence of individualism rests 
upon the significance of underlying values within libertarianism, and their relationship to 
quotidian considerations.  
 To begin, examine the figure below, which illustrates the linear relationship between 
criteria necessary to achieve individualist status within the libertarian framework. Beginning 
with conceptions of autonomy, libertarians award moral value to worthy individuals with the 
attainment of moral standing; individuals with such moral standing are acknowledged to posses 
                                                
 
8 Robert S. Taylor, “Self-Ownership and the Limits of Libertarianism,” Social Theory and Practice 3(4), 2005: 465, 
note 1 
9 Wissenburg, “The Concept of Nature in Libertarianism,” 7; The prime differentiation between anarchism and 
libertarianism lies in the latter’s allowance of a monopoly of violence by a minimal state and the former’s rejection 
of any such monopoly. 






self-ownership and self-determination and are thus granted broad protections under the non-
aggression principle (NAP) and non-interference principle (NIP).  
 This progression represents the logical flow of libertarian normativity: as A considers 
entity B to be autonomous – the requirements of which will be discussed shortly – A grants 
moral standing to B; now within the moral community, B is acknowledged as maintaining the 
propensities of self-ownership and self-determination; finally, A ensures self-compliance with 
the NAP and NIP to guarantee an unperturbed existence (by A at least) for B. Note that with B a 
member of the moral community, she must reciprocally acknowledge A’s self-ownership, self-
determination, and protections under the NAP and NIP. In this way, individual status is a 
reciprocal phenomenon built upon adherence to the principles derived from conceptions of moral 
standing – this inherent social embeddedness is discussed further in Part II. Libertarian theorists 
overwhelmingly utilize criteria predicated on some notion of autonomy: Wissenburg identifies 
that “characterizations that combine choice with will, consciousness and rationality” dominate 
libertarian justificatory arguments.12 Lipson and Vallentyne similarly pronounce the supremacy 
of autonomy within libertarian ontological foundations: “the only way in which [libertarians] 
have grounded moral standing is, somehow or other, in autonomy.”13 Yet, while libertarians find 
                                                
 
12 Wissenburg, “The Concept of Nature,” 10-11. 
13 Morris Lipson and Peter Vallentyne, “Libertarianism, Autonomy, and Children,” Public Affairs Quarterly 5(4), 









solidarity in their utilization of autonomy14, they remain split on the necessities of being 
autonomous. To maintain coherent discussion, this work will utilize Lipson and Vallentyne’s 
definition of autonomy as a launchpad for analyzing the split reactions of libertarian theory:  
A being cannot be fully autonomous unless it has the capacity both to determine 
what many of its (at least immediate) desires are, and to act on the basis of (some 
of) them.15 
 
This definition proves helpful in distinguishing the threads of minimalism and prudentialism 
within libertarian theory. The former maintains that the fulfillment of the previous definition 
suffices for the attainment of full moral standing, and the benefits such entails in a libertarian 
society.16 Prudentialism, by contrast, finds such minimal fulfillment of autonomy as guaranteeing 
minimal (or partial) moral standing, with some benefits of moral standing applying and other 
benefits withheld17; moreover, the attainment of full moral standing requires fulfilling additional 
constraints.18 These additional constraints differ between scholars and represent myriad potential 
threads of analysis. For example, Kane correlates the development of free will and self-formation 
                                                
 
14 An important deviation from this solidarity is found in Narveson, who (erroneously) maintains that autonomy is 
not a value inherently appreciated by all humans and instead opts to place libertarianism on a foundation of a 
Gauthier-Lockean Proviso of non-interference (The Libertarian Idea, 175-177); with respect to Narveson, this 
transition seems inappropriate primarily because it appears to contradict to some degree the natural law logic 
inherent within libertarianism: Narveson declares the nature of man to be as a practical interpreter of socio-
environments (Respecting Persons in Theory and Practice, 72-76) and Rothbard directly connects such pragmatics 
to the autonomy of individuals (For a New Liberty, 33); thus, it seems awkward and inappropriate to a degree to 
disconnect autonomy from the practical expression and utilization of that autonomy. Secondarily, Narveson’s 
founding in a generalized, contractual, Pareto-framed non-interference between individuals ignores the normative 
step of identifying individuals who may be considered within the confines of that contract and, without an explicit 
foundation in autonomy, finds itself trapped in circuitous reasoning. For these reasons, we may consider Narveson 
as an unwilling adherent of autonomy as the criteria for moral status regardless his apparent protests.  
15 Lipson and Vallentyne, “Libertarianism, Autonomy, and Children,” 339. 
16 Ibid, 345. 
17 For example, within prudentialism autonomy children would likely have protection from abuse/neglect but not 
protection against interference (forcing vaccinations, education, etc.) 




with the degree of moral standing obtained.19 And although Lipson and Vallentyne argue most 
prudentialist conditions would center around an individual’s “capacity to reflect” upon present 
desires, rather than just identify and pursue them,20 the variegated strands of such conditions 
does not constitute a necessary focus of this work. Part III will critically examine prudentialist 
criteria and argue for rational acceptance of minimalist autonomy within libertarian theory. Thus, 
we see that libertarian political theory holds autonomy as the foundational criteria upon which 
moral recognition and status are built.  
After achieving moral standing, individuals are recognized as possessing self-ownership 
and self-determination and are granted protections under the non-aggression and non-
interference principles by other individuals. Broad hallmarks of Western liberalism, self-
ownership and self-determination constitute the capacities of autonomous individuals which, in 
greater society, justify mass adherence to the principles of non-aggression and non-interference. 
Succinctly described, self-ownership can be considered the application of stringently exclusive 
property rights to one’s person. Utilizing A.M. Honoré’s works on property rights21 one sees that 
such application generates negative freedoms for the individual vis-à-vis outside agents and 
interference.22 From self-ownership, then, emerges the freedom of self-determination: the 
“power to be the ultimate creator and sustainer of one’s own ends or purposes.”23 Combined, 
these two rights present the overarching ideal of libertarianism, that of individuals free to 
                                                
 
19 Robert Kane, “Libertarianism,” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic 
Tradition 144(1), 2009: 36.  
20 Lipson and Vallentyne, “Libertarianism, Autonomy, and Children,” 339. 
21 Taylor, “Self-Ownership,” 466-67. Taylor sums Honoré’s theorizing on exclusive property rights as culminating 
in four distinctive aspects of exclusive property: first, one may utilize exclusive property at-will without restriction; 
second, one may exclude others from utilizing exclusive property; third, one may voluntarily transfer ownership of 
exclusive property; and finally, one cannot have exclusive property taken from them without consent.  
22 Axel Gosseries, “Left-Libertarianism and Left-Hobbesianism,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 65, 2009: 201. 




associate and pursue happiness with full control over their bodies and lives. To ensure such an 
ideal, however, requires mutually reciprocal cognizance of and adherence to principles which 
protect the requisites of that ideal – namely, self-ownership and self-determination. To 
accomplish such protection, two chief principles within libertarian theory are utilized: the non-
aggression principle (NAP) and the non-interference principle (NIP).  
 The recognition of an individual’s moral standing generates a moral boundary around 
her. Nozick describes a Lockean boundary set by an individual’s natural rights which limits the 
morally allowable interactions across the boundary by outside agents.24 Such a boundary 
similarly surrounds individual property and limits its use by non-owners.25 Interactions across 
these boundaries require consent; non-approved infringements require compensation (the 
formulation and criteria for which remain contested26). In fulfilling the libertarian ideal of 
widespread individual self-ownership and self-determination, then, principles upholding the 
inviolability of such moral boundaries must be reciprocally adhered to by members of the 
community. For this purpose, libertarians utilize the NAP and NIP. The non-aggression principle 
holds that individuals must refrain from violence or intimidation against others, with the 
categorical exception of self-defense. While generally applying to quotidian considerations and 
market transactions, the non-aggression principle also argues against violence for potentially 
positive reasons; the NAP prevents the use of force to save someone from self-harm, for 
                                                
 
24 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 57. 
25 Rothbard nicely connects the right of self-ownership to property rights. After establishing the right to self-
ownership, Rothbard continues to argue “...people are not floating wraiths; they are not self-subsistent entities; they 
can only survive and flourish by grappling with the earth around them. [...] Man, in other words, must own not only 
his own person, but also material objects for his control and use.” Rothbard, For a New Liberty, 37. 
26 For an example of such contestation, see David Sobel, “Backing Away from Libertarian Self-Ownership,” Ethics 




example.27 The non-interference principle, then, is a broad extension of the NAP as applied to 
the metaphysical. Whereas the NAP restrains force between individuals, the NIP restricts the 
interference of others’ liberty. An adequate depiction of the NIP argues that 
Libertarians hold ... such duties as: not to directly and significantly harm others 
(the NAP) or their property, to keep agreements, to refrain from lying and other 
sorts of deception, and to compensate those whom we wrong. ... we have a duty 
not to interfere with the liberty of others as long as they are fulfilling these 
duties.28 
 
In praxis, such a principle dictates the non-interference into otherwise morally contestable 
aspects of individuals’ lives. Drug use, financial planning, healthcare decisions, decisions of 
lifestyle, and other facets of life are thus exempted from public persecution and interference, 
until such time as such activities interfere with the liberty of others. In a society of individuals 
whom mutually accept the NAP and NIP, then, individuals are left to act at-will and unrestrained 
within the confines and protections of these dual principles.  
 Thus the importance of moral standing within libertarian theory is manifest within the 
reciprocal protections granted by the NAP and NIP. Individuals not granted moral standing – not 
found to be autonomous – are either ignored by NAP and NIP protections or, in instances of 
partial standing, are granted incomplete protections by them.29 For the libertarian society, 
autonomy proves the crucial standard by which individuals recognize moral value and grant 
protections from aggression and interference. It is no wonder, then, that Wissenburg correctly 
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describes the libertarian mantra as declaring that “autonomy trumps authority every time.”30 
Understanding the supremacy of moral standing, and the underlying contestation of the primary 
criteria – autonomy – within libertarian theory, one can undertake further analysis of how such 
foundational criteria relate to environmental and ecological considerations, as is the intended 
goal of this work. Before such theoretical analysis can commence, however, more detail on the 
current relationship between libertarian theory and the environment is necessary; it is to such 
details we now turn.  
Libertarianism and the Environment 
Libertarianism overwhelmingly focuses on issues of immediate salience; adherents often self-
restrict to politico-economic questions of human politics.31 This can be traced to libertarianism’s 
anti-statist positioning, insomuch as most political issues considered practical within the 
libertarian framework have been those that fit within the narrative of the individual versus the 
state. Thus, when considering libertarianism’s relationship to the environment, one is unsurprised 
to find a characteristic lack of linkages and considerations. Wissenburg accurately sums this 
reality: “If libertarianism and environment are mixed, it is almost exclusively to discus [sic] and 
promote prudent use of limited natural resources.”32 The environment of libertarians has been 
one of raw resources, malleable by and for human interests. For Narveson, this ontological 
understanding is intentional; nonhumans lack objective value beyond that which is 
instrumentally-derived by humans: “[e]nvironmental concern that extends beyond concern for 
                                                
 
30 Wissenburg, “The Concept of Nature,” 2. 
31 Ibid, 14. 




humans is not a matter of right or wrong, but a mere matter of taste.”33 However, this apparent 
rejection of inherent nonhuman value hides yet another contentious ideological split within 
libertarianism. Distinguishing between left-libertarians and right-libertarians, Taylor describes 
the former as supporting redistribution of natural resources and the latter as supporting no 
redistribution.34 Such distinction arose in response to the question of who owns nature at the 
onset: left-libertarians (such as Vallentyne) argue nature to be a communal good, whose value 
and use requires redistribution within the community; right-libertarians (Nozick, Narveson) 
argue nature to be unclaimed property, whose value is determined by whomsoever utilizes it.3536 
Both sects, however, perceive the environment in atomistic and instrumentalist terms – an 
extension of human individualism.37 Moreover, both right- and left-libertarians maintain a 
politico-economic focus vis-à-vis the environment, and both utilize the logical structure founded 
in autonomy as discussed in the preceding section. Yet, due to political and economic biases, 
libertarians rarely examine the contestable arena of autonomy in relation to nonhumans. 
Wissenburg points out 
...libertarians do not discuss most of what characterizes humans but focus only on 
those propensities and properties that directly support libertarian political 
philosophy. That humans are mostly bald, bipedal, and beakless is irrelevant.38 
 
Thus, in examining the foundation of libertarian protections – autonomy – libertarians rarely 
analyze its requisite criteria; however, such criteria support the totality of libertarian theory and 
thus necessitate analytic consideration. While scholars declare “[l]ibertarianism is concerned 
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with human liberty; it is the liberty of humans that, morally speaking, matters”39 and that 
“‘freedom’ refers solely to a relation of men to other men,”40 we cannot accept such traditional 
reinforcement by accepting the human/nonhuman dichotomy; we cannot accept tradition as the 
foundational bedrock of libertarian logic because (A) libertarianism, as a normative theory of 
individual rights, was founded to counteract the tradition of state-sanctioned oppression and (B) 
acceptance of the human/nonhuman dichotomy precludes libertarianism from attaining a more 
consistent and solid logical foundation and (as we’ll discuss in Part III) prohibits the 
achievement of a true libertarian society.41 
 Before detailing further the relationship of libertarianism and the environment, it is 
necessary to delineate the intended meaning of environment within this work. For purposes of 
convenience, coherence, and reasonable ambition, this work restrains environmental 
considerations to that of humans and nonhumans, the latter defined broadly as individualized 
biotic entities which are born, maintain a capacity for animation, can be expected to die, and (of 
course) are not human. Thus, this work will neglect to focus on abiotic entities – such as rocks 
and air – as well as inanimate biotic entities – most noticeably plants.42 These excluded entities 
are not, I must state, beyond the realm of analytic deliberation or libertarian concern; on the 
contrary, their inclusion would simply exceed the workable confines of this analysis. Going 
forward, this work’s environmental focus is thus restrained to considerations of those entities 
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previous characterized; summarily, such entities comprise the category “nonhumans” as herein 
referred and examined. This clarification ensures that, in future discussions throughout this text, 
nonhuman categorically neglects nonhuman entities that are abiotic and/or inanimate.  
 Returning to the discussion at hand, then, we see throughout libertarianism, in its relation 
to the natural world, a split between humans and nonhumans seemingly founded on conceptions 
of autonomy. These conceptions formulate a gestalt “baseline” assumption within libertarianism 
that humans are rational, willful beings and nonhumans are not.43 Recall that such a baseline, that 
nonhumans lack autonomy, prevents complete protection of nonhumans under NAP and NIP; 
while libertarians disagree over the criteria of autonomy and the scope of partial or minimal 
autonomy vis-à-vis nonhumans, the outcomes of this overarching rejection of fully autonomous 
nonhumans heralds the same overall result: nonhumans do not receive NAP or NIP protections. 
While the consequences of such can vary greatly – ranging with degree of moral standing 
allotted and perquisite criteria for autonomy – such is irrelevant to this work. Of immediate 
concern, rather, is the question of why libertarianism, at the macro level, maintains the 
dichotomy and, furthermore, if such a dichotomy is supported by the libertarian logical structure 
when confronted with the failings of prudentialist autonomy. The latter consideration forms the 
great majority of this work, with the results aiming at the discussion of an unprecedented 
ecologically conscious libertarian theory wherein both logical structure and foundational 
principles are left fundamentally unaltered. Prior to such efforts, however, is a necessary 
discussion of the limitations and relevance of such an undertaking. These concerns comprise the 
remaining portion of Part I. 
                                                
 




Constraints and Caveats 
 “Nonhumans” 
The myriad categorical conceptualizations used by political theorists, environmental scholars, 
activists, and laymen to describe nature, the environment, and nonhumans could fill a tedious 
volume of technical adjustments and arduous categorizations. Earlier in this chapter I defined 
nonhumans as biotic entities that are born, maintain a capacity for animation, can be expected to 
die, and are not human. This is an extremely broad category; indeed, it encapsulates a majority of 
tangible life on Earth. It must be addressed, then, that many scholars whose arguments I consider 
do not necessarily agree with this conceptualization of nonhumans. Wise, whose legal 
argumentation provides a partial foundation for my arguments, argues exclusively for the moral 
inclusion of chimpanzees and bonobos. Although he acknowledges the potential for expansion of 
his arguments to other nonhuman animals44, Wise in no way articulates such application as I 
provide here. Similarly, the arguments of many libertarian and liberal scholars apply directly to 
animals or directly to only specific animals (most commonly apes). Thus, when arguing for 
ecological consideration, utilizing my conception of nonhumans, within their arguments I am 
expanding the parameters of the initial debate. Although categorical mismatches between 
scholars’ “nonhuman” or “animal” categories and my “nonhuman” category exist, the wider 
breadth of my nonhuman category encompasses the small categories, strips their contrived 
categorical boundaries, and continues examining the question of nonhuman self-ownership. And 
so, whereas Nozick and Narveson contemplate strictly animals, our discussion will include 
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broader categories of life such as insects; this wider categorical starting point emerges 
necessarily from our bottom-up contemplation of moral standing criteria.  
Libertarian “Theory” 
As with most political theories, libertarian theory has many diverging schools of thought. 
Wikipedia holds information on twenty-eight such schools, ranging from libertarian communism 
to panarchism; surely, with all these nuanced variances, it would be difficult to attempt 
discussion of a singular libertarian theory. However, this difficulty does not apply to our 
discussion. For each of these varying schools of libertarianism adhere to the base logic outlined 
earlier in this chapter, and each school upholds the human/nonhuman dichotomy. While these 
different strands argue about proper interpersonal relationships, they spawn from the original 
thread of moral reasoning that blindly accepts the human/nonhuman dichotomy. And so while it 
would be somewhat concerning to generalize so greatly about a large bulk of theorization, this 
consistent foundation of moral exclusion allows our discussion to consider simply the 
overarching image of libertarianism.  
Ecological v. “Green” Libertarianism 
While we do not need to consider the tenets of each subgenre of libertarian theory, I find it 
necessary to make one paramount distinction abundantly clear. Some schools of libertarianism, 
namely green libertarianism, appear at conflict with my claims of novelty; why should there be 
an ecological libertarianism if green libertarianism is already incorporating environmental 
concern into the libertarian framework? The justification comes from the origination-perspective 
of the argument. All forms of libertarianism, at least that this author is aware of, accept the 
human/nonhuman dichotomy, and transition therefrom to arguments of appropriate human 
relations. Ecological libertarianism emphasizes rather the traditional foundational criteria of 




prudentialist autonomy. This is where an ecological libertarianism gains its radical placement 
and divergence from other libertarian theories. Green libertarianism, by contrast, simply argues 
for the incorporation of environmental concerns (global warming, resource depletion, etc.) into 
free-market and business practices – such is the ideological companion to free-market 
environmentalism. In praxis, this translates into a large conceptual divide: green libertarianism 
seeks to utilize the free-market to alleviate environmental ailments, while ecological 
libertarianism sees nonhumans as free agents morally unsusceptible to the ravages of trade – 
green libertarians may argue how to control animal populations through trade while ecological 
libertarians declare such trade barred on grounds of individual liberty. This is the distinction 
between an ecological libertarianism and extant libertarian schools.  
Relevance and Purpose 
The questions of purpose and relevance serve as primary conduits for the justification of this 
project’s research and arguments. Many scholars, scientists, and activists have already moved for 
reinterpretation or renewed expression of political ideologies in conjunction with ecological and 
environmental knowledge and goals; moreover, philosophers have debated Man’s placement 
within the universe for millennia. And so this work enters an already packed room of discussion. 
However, there is room for this project amidst the preeminent strands of theorizing. This section 
will outline a few nexuses of interaction between this project and extant theorizations and 
scholarly debates – the purpose of this project will follow such placement justification.  
 To begin, we can re-acknowledge the larger philosophical placement within which our 
discussion focuses. Although these loftier discussions are beyond this work’s ambition, we can 
examine its placement within the larger context of Western liberalism. Thus, it may do some 
good to evaluate the direct relationships between this project and other liberal-environmental 




identifies a primary concern to be the limits of liberalism in producing environmentalist 
benefits.45A great focus of contemporary political theory has arisen from such limitations in 
Western liberalism vis-à-vis environmental concerns. Some, such as Dryzek and Eckersley, have 
attempted reformulations of democratic theory – such as Dryzek’s discursive democracy and 
Eckersley’s “green state”46 – to achieve environmentally beneficial outcomes. Some, such as de-
Shalit, have argued for transformations in liberal structures and institutions to allow greater 
intervention on behalf of environmental concerns.47 Others, such as Ophuls, see liberal 
limitations as facilitating a rise in authoritarian regimes (or authoritarian politics generally) to 
ensure humanity’s survival following environmental collapse.48 Many strands of environmental 
political theory emerge from the now standardized foundation of liberalism’s inability to resolve 
environmental problems. These limitations, differently expressed as they are, generally focus on 
the core components of liberalism – individualism, instrumental rationality, and atomistic agents 
– as proving incapable of solving environmental problems. And so, this project questions these 
strands of theorization by questioning the true incapacity of liberalism to engage meaningfully 
with environmental concerns. More directly, the rejection of the human/nonhuman dichotomy 
within liberalism facilitates the questioning of theorizations which flow therefrom; for if 
liberalism is conceived as incapable of alleviating environmental problems, then rejecting the 
dichotomy within liberalism will drastically reconfigure the debate. If, as this project intends, the 
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human/nonhuman dichotomy may be rejected within libertarianism, then a new critical route for 
liberalism to achieve success in environmental issues will be manifest. Thus, in the first and most 
general regard, this project’s relevance comes from rejecting the foundational assumption of 
disconnect between environmental goals and liberalism expressed among contemporary political 
theorists. Thus, we can see that the perceived limitations of liberalism may in the context of 
nonhumans be really the radical means by which such agents achieve greater outcomes than at 
present.49 For the context of our discussion, however, the point may simply be made that in 
rejecting the human/nonhuman dichotomy, our discussion positions itself as opposite many 
contemporary liberal theorists – although the overarching environmentalist goals may be similar.  
 Viewing more specifically the placement of this work in context of environmental 
political theorists, we see a few of the myriad links that potentially may form. We can take a 
moment to appreciate some of these links. We can begin with de-Shalit’s evaluation of liberalism 
and the environment.50 De-Shalit’s overall assessment maintains that liberalism provides great 
opportunities for the expression and development of environmental considerations, while 
inherently failing to provide substantially the avenues for collective action and state interventions 
on the environment’s behalf. While a fair assessment, there remain a few specific areas for 
evaluation within de-Shalit’s argumentation. Foremost, de-Shalit’s conception of liberalism 
accepts the human/nonhuman dichotomy. Although acknowledging the potential for equal moral 
standing between humans and nonhumans within liberalism,51 de-Shalit nonetheless accepts (as 
have most liberal theorists) the human/nonhuman moral divide as a foundational aspect of 
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liberalism from which he may draw analyses. This project agrees with de-Shalit in that liberalism 
has room for nonhuman moral inclusion, but finds such agreement as prohibitive of accepting the 
human/nonhuman dichotomy.52 When considering the potential dissolution of this dichotomy, 
de-Shalit finds two general areas which prove problematic: first, that nonhumans cannot enter 
contracts and thus cannot receive contractarian moral status in liberal societies, and second that 
human-human obligations always supersede human-nonhuman obligations.53  
Bailey responds critically to the second consideration, arguing such obligatory 
prioritization as the result of Western culture not the result of biological impulses.54 Identifying 
different cultural cosmologies, Bailey thus articulates the dichotomy as an iterative element of 
Western theoretical tradition; the privileging of Man above nonhumans is, following this 
critique, a result of continued anthropocentric bias in Western theorizing and not an inherent 
aspect of Man’s existence.55 This project accepts Bailey’s critique and leaves the contractarian 
problem to other theorists (for the moment at least).56  
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Wissenburg, conversely, argues that extant liberal theory can reasonably accommodate 
environmental concerns given particular understandings and framings of liberal ideals.57 Arguing 
for a green liberalism, Wissenburg follows the logic of Rawls in generating a restraint principle 
that ultimately allows the continuation of liberal logic and ideals with the additional moral 
constraint for the public good of adequate environmental protection. Of course, this becomes 
problematic when defining public goods – particularly in the libertarian context, where public 
goods are scarce.58 Wissenburg further acknowledges the potential for expanding human judicial 
concerns and status to nonhumans as a means of greening liberalism, but states that 
...as long as humans can argue for the existence of relevant differences between 
themselves and animals, the status of animals as subjects cannot a priori be taken 
as part of our considered judgments.59 
 
Yet, this defeatist attitude need not bar or otherwise hinder discussions that reject the 
human/nonhuman dichotomy; indeed, such discussion readily denies the pessimism of 
Wissenburg’s observation in favor of open, normative contemplation. Furthermore, Bailey’s 
critique concerning the rational applicability of such differences as sufficient for moral criteria 
demonstrates the inherent need to disregard such hesitation in theorizing.60 Wissenburg’s 
contemplation on libertarianism’s relationship to the environment begat the discussion which we 
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continue, and it is apparent that Wissenburg continued the discussion in a vastly different (and 
more traditional) way.  
Our discussion will also encounter Sagoff’s consideration that within liberal societies and 
cultures individual preferences can be split along personal dimensions (primarily between 
consumer and citizen preferences) and are never truly unified.61 Moreover, Sagoff holds, these 
dimensional preferences may exist in broad formulations and varied contexts, and not all may be 
considered in terms of justice or equality.62 This reality outlines myriad internal conflicts and 
complicates the decision-making and considerations of individual moral agents; this irresolvable 
tendency toward internal conflict, born by the varying demands of individual personality and 
social dimensions, is a tremendous starting point for the analytic consideration of preference 
generation as a conduit to moral standing. For if the inability to calculate and interpret human 
preference generation and interaction is true, it quickly becomes questionable if such is sufficient 
to uphold the human/nonhuman dichotomy. Furthermore, the importance of preferences within 
libertarianism and liberalism broadly is paramount – it is by these preferences that individuals 
make choices, and the negative liberties of libertarianism promotes the freest selection of such 
choices and thereby the expression of these preferences. If Sagoff is correct, and human 
preferences are variegated, myriad, and complex, then difficulty emerges in maintaining the 
dichotomy; for, as will be discussed further in Part III, it is objectively impossible to trace 
behavior to a particular preference or mixture of preferences. This problem will in Part III push 
our discussion toward an acceptance of minimalist autonomy within libertarianism.  
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Lastly, this project engages scholars such as Dryzek and Eckersley by questioning first 
their acceptance of the human/nonhuman dichotomy and second the potential consequences to 
their theorization should the dichotomy be abolished. At least superficially, it appears that their 
concerns and arguments – particularly Dryzek’s focus on expanding deliberation to include 
nonhuman voices – are, or could be, upheld by the full inclusion of nonhumans within the moral 
community; interestingly, an ecological libertarianism could concretize the moral status of 
nonhuman agents such as necessary to view their voice as requisite for a functioning, 
environmentally conscious liberal society – in this way, an ecological libertarianism could 
demonstrate the non-conflictual relationship between liberalism and environmentally beneficial 
reasoning and outcomes.63 Perhaps this is an idealistic overstretching of this project’s potential. 
Regardless, this project finds tremendous placement within extant strands of political theory and 
contemporary environmental political theorists, in addition to the more esoteric relationships to 
libertarian scholars.  
Beyond these linkages to extant political theorists, this project maintains two overarching 
and admittedly ambitious goals. First is the establishment of an immanent critique of 
libertarianism in pursuit of logical consistency and rational argumentation. As demonstrated 
earlier, the libertarian-environment relationship finds resilience primarily through tradition and 
adherence to quotidian questions of socioeconomics. Yet, tradition does not demarcate the 
existence of sound, informed reasoning and, as such, cannot suffice alone to uphold a political 
theory of proper inter-agent relations. The second primary goal of this project is the 
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contemplation of an ecologically sound libertarian political theory, which acknowledges 
nonhuman self-ownership in line with other extant libertarian ideals (such as the NIP and NAP) 
and theorizing. This secondary goal will manifest in Part IV, following further consideration of 
the need and significance of the first goal in Parts II and III. Important for these goals, then, is a 
brief consideration of what this work’s goals are not. Following Ophuls’s depiction of politics – 
“Politics ... is about the definition of reality: what epistemology, ontology, and ethic shall 
constitute our rule of life?”64 – our discussion will not deviate into the minutiae of logistics, 
legality, or political structures. The purpose of this work is to identify and attempt to correct 
logical inconsistencies at the foundation of libertarian theory and envision the overarching 
adjustments necessary for libertarianism to maintain core components and principles. Moreover, 
and to that end, this work will identify hidden, foundational aspects within libertarianism that 
herald significance for libertarian theory – particularly libertarianism’s inherent social 
embeddedness. As such, our discussion must be limited to the matters before us and should not 
be distracted by associated concerns. Questions of specific individual action, of morally 
ambiguous scenarios, or of correct personal lifestyles will not be considered. Thus, this project 
willingly avoids complex moral dilemmas and specific ethical guidance; such is both too narrow 
and too grand for the context of our discussion.  
With these acknowledgements now complete, we may turn to consider specific 
ecologically conscious arguments and theorizing. These considerations constitute Part II, while 
their critical application to criteria of prudentialist autonomy within libertarianism comprises 
Part III, and Part IV discusses their incorporation into a theory of ecological libertarianism.  
                                                
 








With the first chapter’s discussion concerning libertarianism’s foundation, logical structure, and 
relationship to environmental concerns complete, we can turn now to considering specific 
arguments pertinent to the discussion of nonhuman moral status. These ecological conditions 
construct the framework of consideration within which the original question of nonhuman self-
ownership may be evaluated. Broadly, these conditions culminate in a framework centered on 
the inherent social embeddedness of libertarian theory and supported by non-anthropocentric 
reasoning. This framework will set the stage for an open consideration of the moral status of 
nonhumans within libertarian theory (Part III) and the development of an ecological libertarian 
theory of justice (Part IV).  
Social Embeddedness / Interconnectivity   
Perhaps the most antithetical condition to libertarianism is forcible coexistence; indeed, 
libertarianism appears to despise any notion that humans are not fully individual beings living 
lives is of potential solitude. Yet this perceived hostility is incorrect – not just on scientific and 
sociological/anthropological understandings of Man, but also on libertarianism’s logical 
structure. For as we discussed earlier, NAP and NIP protections within libertarian society 
manifest explicitly in intersubjective norms of reciprocity. A only has liberty because B follows 
NIP and NAP, and B does so because A similarly reciprocates and grants liberty to B. Thus 




to explain the practical transitions from anarchy to a minimalist state structure.65 Narveson 
similarly acknowledges the inherent social embeddedness of individuals within libertarian 
societies, going so far so admit that individuals’ “...very personalities are defined by relation to 
their peers, their acquaintances, their loved ones, and so on.”66  Rothbard concurs as well: “...it is 
evident that individuals always learn from each other, cooperate and interact with each other; and 
that this, too, is required for man’s survival.”67 Metaphysically, this embeddedness is meaningful 
and constructive to the individual, meaning libertarian theory doesn’t (and rationally cannot) 
“assume detachment” between the individual and their social context.68 This hidden, oft-
neglected foundation of libertarian theory is the area in which the consideration of nonhuman 
moral status must focus. For now the question, for a libertarian society, can be seen as “how 
should libertarians identify moral individuals when constructing their theory of justice?”69 To 
focus on this question, which will be highlighted in the next chapter, we must first continue 
building our analytic framework. Foremost, based on our acknowledgement of social 
interconnectedness between human individuals, we must expand the scope of social interaction 
to consider the role of nonhumans. The best means of accomplishing this, in an ahistorical and 
transcontextual way, is to accept ecological interdependence within our libertarian foundation. 
We must engage in ecological thinking. Morton describes ecological thinking as acknowledging 
that 
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[e]xistence is always coexistence. No man is an Island. Human beings need each 
other as much as they need an environment. Human beings are each others’ 
environment.70 
 
Without a particular frame or target, this thinking encourages us to broadly consider the realities 
of ecological interconnectedness within contemporary theorizing. Morton argues ecological 
thinking to be in stark contrast to libertarianism or “other right-wing sacred cows”71; however, as 
we just discussed, this is not true – or, if it is perceived as true, it need not be. Compassion ranks 
among the highest means of attaining an ecological mentality for Morton,72 and compassion is 
the unexpected backbone of a flourishing libertarian society. Higgs and Higgs acknowledge 
compassion as the undeniable trait necessary for a true libertarian society and its constituents to 
flourish.73 This is no accidental nor trivial admission of libertarianism, but a signal indicative of 
libertarian logical reality.74 They argue that even unilateral compassion, wherein the beneficiary 
makes no drastic change in response to assistance, is a virtue necessary for a functional 
libertarian society. And so, ecological thinking is not antithetical to libertarian logic; indeed, it 
flows directly from libertarian understandings of compassion and the realities of social 
coexistence. While not endeavoring to connect the totality of Morton’s ecological thought, its 
message of radical openness – “open forever, without the possibility of closing again”75 – and 
broad consideration of interconnectedness serves a prime ecological condition for the evaluation 
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of nonhuman moral status within libertarian theory. And so, this condition calls us to remember 
in our analysis the truly (and paradoxically) social nature of libertarian theory, and consider this 
foundational reality when discussing nonhuman moral status.  It is because of this hidden aspect 
of libertarian theory – and its true significance for libertarianism – that the question of nonhuman 
moral status may reasonably be considered.  
Fair Analysis (Aristotle’s Axiom) 
After acknowledging the social embeddedness within libertarian theory, and the impetus to 
reconsider the moral criteria utilized in determining the limits of such embeddedness, the first 
necessary analytic condition is that of fair analysis. While an obvious necessity for quality 
research, for our context fair analysis connotes a lack of anthropocentric bias. Thus, the first  
ecological consideration necessary for our discussion of nonhuman moral status within 
libertarianism arises in response to the phenomenon of Aristotle’s Axiom; succinctly defined, 
Aristotle’s Axiom is the tendency of individuals, when formulating hierarchical arrangements, to 
assign themselves to the highest category within the hierarchy.76 Wise identifies how, in 
formatting these hierarchies, individuals utilize force or persuasion to justify others’ lower 
placement within the caste – “Soldiers like the first way; philosopher, legal writers, ... and priests 
prefer the second.”77 And so, in responding to this narcissistic characteristic of humans, we have 
numerous routes of argumentation. For convenience of discussion, we will use only a selective 
grouping of these arguments which culminate in the ecological condition of Fair Analysis. 
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 Wise presents three analytic ‘rules’ to abide when evaluating claims concerning the 
assigning of rights conditional upon hierarchical arrangements. These rules state: first, it requires 
substantial effort to adequately place man within nature; second, arguments confirming human 
superiority must be met with analytic skepticism and analyzed intensely; and third, arguments 
must be analyzed fairly, and “special pleading” for human superiority must be ignored.78 Similar 
to these rules are Massumi’s theses on animals to be avoided. These argue, collectively, for fair 
consideration in contemplating human-animal relationships. For our discussion, Massumi’s 
primary thesis – “Do not presume that you have access to a criterion for categorically separating 
the human from the animal”79 – will suffice to bulwark Wise’s rules. When examining the moral 
status of nonhumans within the libertarian judicial concept, then, we will endeavor to abide these 
analytic constraints insomuch as they provide an open, fair marketplace of arguments. Moreover, 
from these constraints we see the burden of proof for argumentation as shifting to supporters of 
the human/nonhuman dichotomy rather than ourselves. This is a necessary transition. 
 Foremost, the burden of proof regarding nonhuman moral status must fall on dichotomy 
supporters to uphold the libertarian commitment to the sacrosanctity of individual liberty. Within 
the libertarian logic, it is individual liberty – rooted in self-ownership – which births side-
constraints and necessary principles for a libertarian society. Moreover, it is this individual 
liberty that provides protection for individuals via the NAP and NIP. And so, in upholding the 
paramount crux of libertarian logic, supporters of the human/nonhuman dichotomy must be 
called to prove the non-liberty of nonhuman agents to justify the latter’s inaccessibility to NAP 
                                                
 
78 Ibid, 123.  
79 Brian Massumi, What Animals Teach Us About Politics (United States: Duke University Press, 2014), 91; This 
argument against special pleading is directly in agreement with Rothbard’s conceptualization of libertarianism’s 




and NIP protections. For when discovering a new form of life – let’s pretend Martian animals are 
discovered in the near future – the question of the goring ox reemerges; moreover, the question 
of obligations and permissions emerges. Historically, humans (at least in the West) have been 
terrible at answering correctly – cycles of oppression and reform, regarding human rights as 
applying to blacks, women, Jews, etc. demonstrate the retroactively corrective tendency of 
Western societies. That groups of humans deserved full moral status and political rights was not 
resultant of great evolutions – women did not ‘evolve’ so as to deserve political rights, society 
changed to recognize their true moral status. Parallels between human rights and animal rights 
have abounded, but libertarianism finds itself particularly open to such considerations. De-Shalit 
identifies perfectly the unnerving scenario underlying the necessity of placing the burden of 
proof with supporters of the human/nonhuman dichotomy:  
The truth of the matter is that any calculation or assessment of the cost/value of 
animals’ lives is, at the end of the day, hypocritical and weird. What we should do 
instead is ask the animal to put a price on the value of its own life. Just as, in the 
case of human lives, we do not ask a murderer what the value of his victims’ lives 
are, but rather (so-to speak) ask the victims themselves, so we should do in the 
case of animals’ lives.80 
 
In shifting the burden of proof of difference to supporters of the dichotomy, what we are 
practically asking is for a justification of the dichotomy and the politics which flow therefrom. 
Essentially, where traditionalists argue that radicals must prove nonhumans to fit criteria A, B, 
and C, we respond by prompting the former to provide proof that these criteria are morally 
significant – in Part III, we will show how these criteria fail to function in praxis. And so, in 
shifting this burden, our project creates a wide net of inviolable rights as the foundation on which 
we may construct moral criteria and re-found the libertarian conception of justice. As criteria are 
                                                
 




applied, we may rationally justify the categorical separation of some entities from others, 
although such work is outside the bounds of this chapter.  
 And so, when Wissenburg declares, “only those who can be moral can design a criteria of 
morality,”81 we must question the intention of such a statement. Following the condition of Fair 
Analysis, we see such declaration as a reiteration of Aristotle’s Axiom and a violation of fair 
analysis of the question before us. From this primary ecological condition, then, we see the moral 
impetus for fair analytic consideration and the removal of traditionalist assumptions and logic for 
a non-anthropocentric rational argumentation.  
Known Unknowns and Unknown Unknowns 
Following our acknowledgment of interconnectedness and openness to fair analytic 
consideration, we can turn to considering known unknowns (KU) and unknown unknowns (UU). 
Following former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s definitions,82 these terms refer 
firstly to that information which we understand to be missing and secondly to that information 
which we do not understand to be missing. Succinctly, these terms correspond with how we may 
understand our body of knowledge vis-à-vis the larger world around it. Considering the goring 
ox question, then, we see the motive of the ox as a known unknown – did it intend on murder, 
did it do so willingly or accidentally, or does it lack intentions altogether? Whether the event was 
an orchestrated display of strength by the ox to the farmer is an unknown unknown. While this 
evaluation may be somewhat superfluous, the real considerations pressed by the KU and UU are 
how we should proceed in our contemplation of animal capacities and their correlates to moral 
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standing. Wise’s work centers on connecting new scientific understandings to traditional 
understandings of law; while admirable, the question necessarily emerges of why such 
discoveries must predate consideration of moral status. Similar to the evolution of political and 
human rights, one may reply to Wise’s undertaking by asserting that chimpanzees and bonobos 
likely did not lack such cognitive function for the past several centuries; rather, human science 
has evolved to understand such capacities as they existed. And so, the question becomes why 
nonhumans must wait upon human scientific advancement for moral consideration. Despite the 
nobility of Wise’s work, then, this project pushes for consideration of known unknowns and 
unknown unknowns by asking what we, as humans, truly known about nonhuman capacities and 
livelihoods before assuming simplistic explanations which will be debunked scientifically years 
later. Morton’s rhetorical question – “[a]re we sure nonhumans don’t have a sense of ‘I’?”83 – is 
unlikely to be answered by contemporary science in a declarative manner. However, ignorance 
of an occurrence is not the erasure of the occurrence, and the lack of knowledge about something 
cannot rationally justify the tossing aside of that something: libertarianism must accept that, as 
humans, we will likely never know the true self-reflective capacities of nonhumans, yet such a 
known unknown cannot justify assuming animals lack any self-reflective capacity. This 
condition could be rephrased so as to state the following: what we do not know about 
nonhumans, and what we do not know we do not know about nonhumans, are not de facto 
justifications for the assignment of inferior moral status. And so, the condition of known 
unknowns and unknown unknowns presses for rational consideration of humanity’s lack of 
knowledge in areas pertinent to the discussion of nonhuman moral status..  
                                                
 




Variety and Non-Interference 
Another pertinent condition for libertarianism to consider is the variety of lifestyles that are 
promoted by libertarian principles. In articulating that moral agents should not be aggressed nor 
infringed upon, libertarianism accepts a plurality of lifestyles that, so long as abiding the NIP and 
NAP, are permitted to continue unperturbed. Within this reality, then, we must question any 
apparent limitation regarding the form of lifestyle sustained. By considering the range of 
plausible livelihoods entertained by agents, then, we must consider if these lifestyles must befit 
any form of recognizable humanness, besides their adherence to NIP and NAP. For the 
Nozickean libertarian, an agent may fully withdrawal from human society and receive 
protections within the NAP and NIP. And so the question manifests: should the form of life 
selected by an individual be useful in determining his candidacy for full moral status? We must 
find within libertarianism an ardent rejection of such conditional status. For the major promise of 
libertarian theory is that individuals may find maximal personal liberty by the mutual abstention 
of violence and interference. And so, the radicalness of one’s lifestyle (within the confines of 
NAP and NIP) is not a disqualifying component of moral status, insomuch as such radicalness is 
the true display of the individualized freedom that is the true goal of libertarian theory. With this 
in mind, the condition of variety and non-interference requires us to realize the tremendous 
variety of lifestyles as not limited within the human realm, insomuch as any human could adapt 
the lifestyle of many nonhumans (be it in diet, habitat, behavior, or priorities) without need for 
explaining such a decision – it is within their freedom and free from interference. Noting this, we 
then turn to the final premise of this condition, which is as follows: the forms of life displayed by 
nonhumans are not morally significant within libertarian theory, and thus cannot suffice to judge 
nonhuman moral status. This condition is an extension of the crux of libertarian theorizing, 




wondering how this condition can abide nonhuman violence, this will be addressed in Part IV’s 
discussion of self-defense and self-preservation.   
Massumi’s Supernormal 
The last condition necessary for our consideration of nonhuman moral status within 
libertarianism is Massumi’s concept of the supernormal. Summed tersely, the supernormal is the 
tendency of individual organisms to surpass normal exertions of instinct and, in doing so, create 
opportunities for the transformation of the normal via evolution and mimicry.84 The upshot of the 
supernormal is twofold: first, it demonstrates that “there is more to nature’s ways than law-
abiding behavior”85; and second, it elucidates the means by which sentient entities develop 
across time. By articulating the individuation of responses, through which few novel responses 
may generate new average responses over time, Massumi’s supernormal represents the very 
individualization of nonhumans proposed by ecological libertarianism. And so, when considering 
the moral status of nonhumans within libertarian theory, Massumi’s supernormal presents a 
condition with the central demands of acknowledging dynamism within and between humans 
and nonhumans and also of acknowledging the necessary individualization of nonhuman entities 
(as well as humans) for behavioral and cultural evolution. Thus, when considering the question 
of nonhumans, Massumi’s Supernormal reminds us that, by the default process of evolution, all 
animals cannot simply act the same – there is individuation and agency86 to nonhumans.  
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When we began considering the question of nonhuman moral status within libertarian theory, we 
identified the contestation that surrounds the foundational conception of autonomy that sets the 
essential standard for moral personhood. At the onset of this chapter we identified the inherent 
social embeddedness within libertarian theory that necessitates the reconsideration of social-
ecological context and agents in developing a libertarian moral community. This serves as the 
foundation of our analytic framework through which we may consider the original question of 
nonhuman self-ownership. The conditions that followed argued for open consideration of the 
question without anthropocentric bias; going forward, we will remember to consider the 
significance of countering Aristotle’s Axiom, of the problem of known unknowns and unknown 
unknowns, of the loose limitations on lifestyle allowed by the NAP/NIP, and of the individuation 
and dynamism of nonhuman agents. With our framework set, we may now turn to considering 
specific criteria of moral inclusion as outlined by libertarian theorists. While not a perfect 
framework, these cumulative conditions should serve well to identify weaknesses within 
prudentialist autonomy and necessitate the acceptance of minimal autonomy within libertarian 
theory. Before turning to this primary task, however, a brief detour is required. As this project is 
concerned centrally with a normative theory of justice predicated on the consideration of 
nonhuman actors, the question of the distinction between is and ought must be briefly discussed 
so as to prevent analytic problems later on.  
The Naturalistic Fallacy 
Of the large debates within philosophy, the question and controversy of the apparent gap 
between is and ought today retains a large significance in the context of normative theorizing. 
Tersely, the question concerns whether, and how, normative/ethical ought statements can be 




apparent disconnect between “non-ethical premises” and “ethical conclusions”87 – this 
disconnect has been titled the Naturalistic Fallacy due to criticism that metaphysically normative 
judgments cannot logically derive from physical reality. Essentially, then, at question is the 
logical creation of norms and ethical judgments in the natural realm. In the context of libertarian 
theory, we find resolution to the Naturalistic Fallacy through an understanding of morality as 
emergent through the naturally pragmatic nature of Man. 
 To begin moving beyond the Naturalistic Fallacy, and begin closing the is/ought gap, we 
can begin with Rothbard’s observation that utilizing a natural rights foundation for libertarianism 
has been “adopted by most of the libertarians, past and present.”88 The argument for natural 
rights – such as the right to self-ownership – emerges from consideration of natural law. 
Rothbard sums the argument of natural theory nicely, stating that 
Natural law theory rests on the insight that we live in a world of more than one—
in fact, a vast number—of entities, and that each entity has distinct and specific 
properties, a distinct ‘nature,’ which can be investigated by man’s reason, by his 
sense perception and mental faculties.89 
 
From this, the argument emerges that as a natural entity humans have a particular nature. 
Rothbard characterizes this nature as one of conscious decision-making; with no “automatic 
instincts,”90 Man must “learn about himself and the world, use his mind to select values, ... and 
act purposively to maintain himself and advance his life.”91 From this arises the need to mix 
labor with nature to survive, which is the foundational argument for property rights generally, 
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and the libertarian restriction on violence – “Violent interference with a man’s learning and 
choices is therefore profoundly ‘antihuman’; it violates the natural law of man’s needs.”92 Thus, 
we see the starting point of libertarian normative considerations as arising from Man’s natural 
inclination to self-sustain through conscious interactions with his environment. But this doesn’t 
alleviate the Naturalistic Fallacy; it does, however, lay the groundwork for doing so.  
 In considering a natural law theory of morals, Narveson expands upon the arguments of 
Rothbard in his consideration of the nature of Man.93 Narveson characterizes the realities of Man 
as being that 
People are built in familiar ways; they don’t last long in the absence of food, 
water, and ambient temperatures falling within a fairly narrow span; they have 
desires, interests, imaginations, reasoning capabilities, and a battery of skills and 
powers, innate and (mostly) otherwise.94 
 
From this expanded characterization of Man’s nature, Narveson develops a pragmatic linkage 
between is and ought. Declaring that morality is subjective and practical, he articulates the 
argument that individuals, in interacting with a social context, are naturally inclined to develop 
some moral precepts and rules – in this sense, he ensures social survival.95 Narveson presents a 
                                                
 
92 Ibid.  
93 Narveson, Respecting Persons in Theory and Practice (United States of America: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 2002): 72-76. 
94 Ibid, 73.  
95 Ibid. Of particular importance is Narveson’s declaration that “When we see how others are, what they can and 
can’t do, and more generally what they are like, we will discover that we are headed for trouble if we ignore them. 
So we back off, provided that others do likewise. We are then in a position to develop genuine moral rules ... which 
advise us to do or refrain from this or that thing that we might, given our druthers, have wanted and intended to do. 
Seeing that these have good results, we solidify these perceptions and abandon others. The result is confirmed, 




syllogistic formulation96 based on these arguments to close the is-ought gap.97 Moreover, 
Narveson details what is meant by practical moral reasoning:  
Morality is practical; the color of grass is practical only to those interested in it. 
[...] But a claim that something is right is a claim that there are some or other 
reasons for doing something, and moreover, something you may not otherwise 
have wanted to do.98 
 
The purpose of morality, then, is seen as being  “lived out in the streets of ordinary life,” with an 
individual impetus on action in response to consideration of social context.99 This leads us to 
conclude that the normative bite of moral philosophy lies “in the direction of reason” – through 
reflection and deliberation over reasoned arguments individuals would act on the rationally 
strongest moral argument(s).100 Thus, we see that morality is constructed by individuals in 
pursuit of social cooperation, with the resultant morality dependent on the particularities of social 
environments. The is of Man – that is, his natural proclivity toward moral reasoning – directly 
closes the gap to ought, as the ought is generated in response to the is conditions of Man’s nature 
and social context.  
When considering the Naturalistic Fallacy, then, and wondering from where the 
normative judgments may derive within libertarianism, we can respond by utilizing Narveson’s 
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theory of practical morality. Morality arises due to the real social conditions that require moral 
reasoning for practical success. Considering our ecological conditions, then, we see how the 
incorporation of naturally descriptive statements may be utilized by human practical moral 
reasoning for the development of normative decisions. By acknowledging and incorporating the 
conditions discussed previously, we find ourselves merely carrying out our natural tendency 
toward moral reasoning; this tendency, as Narveson and Rothbard identify, requires interactions 
and interpretations of nature.  
From this discussion on the Naturalistic Fallacy, we find not only a remedy for potential 
criticisms of the is/ought variety but also the final piece in our analytic framework. If the nature 
of Man is one that includes practical moral reasoning, then it is in the context of such practical 
reasoning that the criteria of autonomy must be examined. If prudentialism and its primary 
expressions – life-planning and reason – cannot serve well Man’s needs in practical moral 
reasoning, then it cannot suffice as the foundational criteria for libertarian theory. We shall see in 
the next section that this is the case. For those wondering how this project could survive in praxis 
in contemporary society or gain acceptance in libertarian scholarship, I offer some of Narveson’s 
guidance on the matter: 
There is thus a question of what to do, as it were, with any ‘philosophical’ 
or ‘critical’ morality we might come up with—a view of morality ‘de jure’ 
rather than ‘de facto.’ But there is also an answer: one can act on it 
(morality) oneself. One can start criticizing people in the light of these 
possibly novel principles you have found to be more reasonable than the 
ones actually reinforced in your current society.”101  
 
                                                
 








With our framework in place, we may now turn to the specific consideration of nonhuman moral 
standing within libertarian theory. This consideration will begin with an identification of 
minimalist and prudentialist autonomy. Afterward, the two prominent outgrowths of 
prudentialism – life-planning and reason – will be critically examined, with a summative 
argument identifying the critical flaws of prudentialism overall. A short discussion on Singer’s 
suffering criteria will follow, with the question of egoist morality finishing our critical analysis. 
From these sections, then, we will walk away acknowledging the theoretical necessity of 
minimalist autonomy criteria and prepared to construct an ecological libertarianism. 
Autonomy 
At the onset of our discussion, we identified the logical progression of individual rights within 
libertarian theory: an individual demonstrates autonomy, obtains moral standing, and is 
considered to be self-owning; this self-owning individual is self-determining, and thus receives 
NAP/NIP protections to enjoy their liberty. We may also recall that the criterion for autonomy 
serves as the filter of moral standing, insomuch as those failing to demonstrate autonomy fail to 
achieve full standing. Yet the proper criteria for autonomy are a contested subject. This 
contestability can be hidden, however, as libertarian scholars often default to the 
human/nonhuman dichotomy without considering the criteria upon which that dichotomy stands. 
Before examining the critical flaws with that assumptive default, let us first identify the two 




 Lipson and Vallentyne provide tremendous overview of the question of autonomy102; 
they identify the intuitive, general starting point of autonomy in stating that 
A being cannot be fully autonomous unless it has the capacity both to determine 
what many of its (at least immediate) desires are, and to act on the basis of (some 
of) them.103 
 
From this general foundation, they describe two formulations of autonomy. Minimalism 
contends that any being that fulfills these general criteria are minimally autonomous and that 
only minimal autonomy is necessary for full standing. Conversely, prudentialism maintains that a 
being who fulfills these general criteria is minimally autonomous, but is not meriting of full 
moral status; additional criteria must be met to earn full standing. Scholars differ in their 
articulation of these additional criteria, but a common thread emerges as the possession of 
reflective or introspective capacity. Libertarian scholars default to prudentialism as a traditional 
byproduct of anthropocentric theorizing. By the end of this chapter, it will be demonstrated how 
prudentialism fails to abide our ecological conditions as well as the logic of libertarianism, and 
why minimalist autonomy is the logically necessary foundation for contemporary libertarianism. 
While not touching on the myriad and nuanced formulations of prudentialism, our discussion 
will focus on the two most prominent conceptions – life-planning and reason – as well as a 
critical flaw inherent to all formulations of prudentialism.  
The culmination of these discussions will be the opening of libertarian theory – as well as 
larger theoretical perspectives, to some extent – to ecological consideration. From this opening, 
we will progress to pave the road for the contemplation of what form an ecological 
libertarianism could take.  
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Life-Planning and Moral Standing  
The primary expression of prudentialist autonomy within libertarianism, as well as liberalism to 
an extent, takes form in the concept of life-planning; the capacity to regulate one’s life 
independently and meaningfully is often cited as necessary for the attainment of full moral 
standing. Nozick’s moral side-constraints, his rational foundation for the NAP and NIP, flow 
directly from such a capacity:  
A person’s shaping his life in accordance with some overall plan is his way of 
giving meaning to his life; only a being with the capacity to so shape his life can 
have or strive for a meaningful life.104 
 
Rawls’s second moral power, the “capacity for a conception of the good,” similarly embodies an 
acceptance of such a capacity criterion, albeit in addition to other criteria; from mutual 
acknowledgement by citizens of such a capacity, then, flows citizen equality.105 The significance 
of individual accountability and life unity for MacIntyre – forming in his view “the most basic 
distinction of all” between humans and nonhumans106 – appears a subtle manipulation of this 
criterion; humans are accountable as authors of their individual life-narratives, such that they 
may intelligibly rationalize actions in the logic of their conception of their lives. The focus on 
accountability presupposes one’s capacity to write their narrative, as justifications for one’s 
actions require a life-narrative conception to already exist. Lomasky extends MacIntyre’s 
arguments slightly, arguing the meaningfulness of life to be derived by lifelong commitment to 
projects which, by virtue of their indefinite and personal characteristics, explain fully the 
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contexts of actions within an individual life.107 Moreover, such projects help constitute one’s 
individual identity and reflect the life-narrative overarching one’s life; paralleling MacIntyre, 
Lomasky thus articulates the authorship of one’s life-narrative as reflected and modified by one’s 
commitment to projects.  
 Through these theorists runs a continued argumentative strand emphasizing the 
importance of one’s capacity to self-formulate and pursue an individualized conception of the 
good for the attainment of full moral standing. While the subtleties and nuances of each 
theorist’s argumentation could justifiably serve for analysis, their immense similarities – namely 
the significant attachment of moral standing to the capacity for meaningfully defining a life – 
allow the categorical grouping of such argumentation within the genre of the “life-planning 
criterion.” Summarily, then, this criterion takes form in the following statement: A being is fully 
autonomous if it can conceptualize a life-plan and attempt to actualize it. The underlying 
capacity for reason, often implicit within this criterion, will be discussed in the next section.     
Within this life-planning criterion, we find flaws that demonstrate the critical inapplicability of 
life-planning as a moral criterion within libertarian theory. 
 To begin, we can find immediate concern regarding the timeframe of life-planning. 
Nozick’s articulation focuses on the greatest abstract – the meaning of life – and its long-term 
formulation as the purposive justification for moral significance108; yet, his language fails to 
dictate when such formulation occurs meaningfully and, moreover, how long such plans must 
last (or predict to last) for moral significance. Similarly, Rawls points to one’s ability to 
construct a long-term conception of the good life as a necessary pinpoint of moral personhood, 
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yet fails to elucidate the logistics of such long-term plans.109 Two brief theoretical cases will 
outline this theoretical-logistical problem.  
 First, imagine the following scenario: a man, Henry, spends thirty years achieving 
immense fortune on Wall Street only to undergo mid-life introspection and, afterward, dedicates 
his life to physically building homes in developing nations. After thirty additional years, Henry’s 
adult life is split perfectly between the Avarice Phase and the Charity Phase. And so, when 
considering the timeline linearity of the life-planning criteria, the necessary question emerges: 
when was Henry a moral person? Following the condition of Variety and Non-Interference, we 
acknowledge that the lifestyle of each phase is irrelevant to the question of moral personhood. 
Assuming Henry to be rational throughout his life, we find the heft of analytic burden to be on 
the timeline of Henry’s life-planning. Consider the question across possible timeline variants: if 
Henry changed his mind completely every ten years, would he consistently be a moral person? If 
he changed his mind every day? Nozick says that a hypothetical amnesiac, forgetting every 
memory every night, would not have the coherence to form a long-term conception of the good 
and thus is not entitled to full moral personhood110, yet he does not address if one constantly re-
rationalizes varying forms of such long-term conceptions. And so, we see one complication of 
using life-planning criteria.  
 Unexpected deaths similarly cloud the practicality of using life-planning criteria. Every 
day, people encounter unexpected and untimely demises, stripped early of their life-potentials. 
Imagine Sally, a young law school student aiming at becoming a public defender. Sally dies 
unexpectedly in her first year at law school, and thus never had an opportunity to act as a public 
                                                
 
109 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 18-19. 




defender. Was her long-term plan nullified by her inability to actualize such a plan? Surely not, 
as she did not (and could not have) anticipate such a turn of events; thus, her planning was 
entirely rational and reasonable. And so, when considering the life-planning criterion, we see 
additionally that the fulfillment of such a life-plan cannot be utilized as retroactive justification 
for moral personhood.111 
 And so, when considering the life-plan criterion we find two immediate conclusions: 
first, the relative time engaged or committed to a particular life-plan does not justify moral 
personhood; second, the actualization of life-plans is not a significant factor in determining the 
moral personhood of an individual adhering to a life-plan. Thus, we are left with some confusion 
regarding how to understand the theoretical application of such life-plan criteria. From these two 
conclusions, however, we can outline a theoretical undercurrent beneath the life-planning 
criterion – the commitment to a life-plan. Why does this commitment matter? What we truly see 
in the articulation of the life-plan criterion is neither the realization of a life-plan nor the 
inflexibility of one’s life, but the will to strive for such things – the commitment to the process of 
actualizing the life-plan. Perhaps even deeper, this commitment reflects an inherent choice in 
lifestyle which, by virtue of selection, reveals the traits and characteristics of each individual. 
But these choices and commitments herald no significance if constrained to the abstract of 
individual consciousness; actions display commitment, and so behavior serves to demonstrate 
true commitment to a life-plan – should Henry, in his Charity Phase, only feel more inclined to 
charity while still acting as miserly as during the previous Avarice Phase, his commitment to the 
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newer life-plan could reasonably be questioned; here, of course, the question still remains of his 
moral status in this scenario.  
 Enter into this discussion the condition of known unknowns and unknown unknowns, and 
we find a wide area for the inclusion of nonhumans within moral personhood under the life-
planning criteria. Foremost, we can easily see the commitment to a life-plan as a known 
unknown, for humans and nonhumans. Whether a wild boar makes a meaningful commitment to 
life a particular way cannot be rationally known; whether a high school graduate in 2016 makes a 
meaningful commitment to become an astronaut cannot be objectively known. Only the behavior 
of these individuals can display their commitment to such lifestyles. Thus, the rationality 
underlying nonhuman commitment to particular life-plans, as a known unknown, cannot be 
utilized as a barrier to nonhuman moral personhood – such would violate fair analysis. Similarly, 
the form of life-plan selected by the wild boar cannot justify rejection of moral status, in 
accordance with the condition of variety and non-interference.  
 When considering the life-planning criterion in light of our ecological conditions, then, 
we find room for nonhuman moral status. This room is generated when we acknowledge that the 
normative bite of a long-term plan comes from the behavioral commitment created to pursue 
such long-term plans. Without knowing the conscious decision-making capacities of all 
nonhuman agents, we are thus left with a known unknown and cannot bar such agents from 
moral personhood; yet, we can identify behavioral consistency in the lives of nonhumans (and 
humans) which demonstrates a commitment to some form of life-plan. Since rejecting moral 
personhood based on life-plan actualization and time spent attempting such actualization are not 
allowed and rejecting moral personhood based on life-plan selected is not allowed, we are left 




thus far, we see it cannot be. And so we see that under critical examination the first major 
articulation of prudentialist autonomy criteria, life-planning, collapses; with individuals only able 
to utilize others’ behavior as a demonstration of the life-plan criteria, individuals are left without 
a solid foundation on which judgments of life-plan commitment may be made – thus, the ability 
of the individual to recognize moral agents collapses back onto reliance on minimalism.     
Reason and Moral Standing 
The second major expression of prudentialist autonomy criteria is the capacity for reason. This 
capacity is frequently utilized as a traditional barrier between humans and nonhumans and is 
implicit within the life-plan criterion; reason, it can be argued, is necessary for the creation and 
adjustment of one’s life-plan. The argument that humans uniquely posses reason is easily made 
and frequently unquestioned. Wise examines the scientific evidence of such arguments, and 
builds the case for specific nonhuman animals to gain moral standing thereby. However, this 
argument appears somewhat lacking in critical rigor. While tiptoeing around the metaphysical 
debates concerning reason, our consideration of nonhuman moral status nonetheless requires a 
fair examination of reason, its place in libertarianism, and how it relates to moral standing.  
 To begin, we will adopt the formulation of reason described by Narveson as an 
“everyday, intuitively manageable concept of rationality,” as his argument that such an ordinary 
formulation is requisite for freedom finds great strength in the theorizing of scholars such as 
Nozick and Rothbard.112 This intuitive conception finds strength in its minimalist understanding 
of individual action, insomuch as there requires no philosophically taxing standard by which an 
individual must demonstrate the reasonability of his actions; such is directly in line with the 
                                                
 




negative freedoms enshrined within libertarianism as no great justification is required by agents 
for their actions or lifestyles so long as they remain NAP/NIP compliant. Indeed, NIP protection 
ensures that, at least legally, individuals within libertarian societies need not explain their 
decision-making nor their behaviors. And so, when Narveson depicts a minimalist rationality, he 
relies upon an intuitive formulation that founds itself by stipulating primarily that individuals 
simply have reasons for their actions.113 An important aspect of individual freedom, according to 
Rawls, is the self-authenticating nature of individuals and their claims114 - individuals with 
freedom have the right to make claims which are axiomatically validated by their very 
proclamation; an individual declaring themself overbearingly impoverished has, by virtue of 
their individual personhood, make a subjectively valid claim which cannot be invalidated 
objectively. In libertarian theory, this self-authentication is implicit within one’s claim of self-
ownership. Thus, when considering reason within our discussion, we will default to Narveson’s 
intuitive conception. But what is the purpose of reason, and how does it relate to moral standing 
within libertarian theory?  
 Foremost, the purpose of reason in libertarianism appears to be the construction of a 
unified life-plan through which one may adopt, adjust, and abandon particular aspects of one’s 
existence. The workability of such a life-plan vis-à-vis nonhuman moral status was discussed in 
the previous section, and so will not be resurfaced here. Narveson also identifies the creation and 
pursuit of intentions and interests as the prime application of reason within libertarianism; the 
practical agent – “the acting individual who has intentions and interests and makes decisions 
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with a view to bringing about what is intended” is the only entity that can be considered free or 
unfree.115 And so we see the utilization of reason which underlies the life-plan criteria, the 
transformation of intentions into behavior. Remembering the arguments of the previous section, 
we see that the behavioral component of this justification is insufficient insomuch as the 
actualization and timeline components of such a life-plan and behavior are not satisfactory 
aspects for contemplating moral standing. Thus we are left critically to consider reason as it 
relates to the possession and transformation of intentions and interests. Yet, this task is somewhat 
implausible for a few reasons. Foremost, there are several problems manifest in dictating the 
possession of intentions and interests. Whether an individual possess a particular intention or 
interest, whether this possession is truly voluntary, whether this possession is clearly discernible, 
and how an individual navigates conflicting intentions are all issues for which there can be no 
objectively certain answer116; more specifically, it is impossible for meta-level consideration of 
others’ intentions to be objectively verifiable and, of more prominent concern, the intentions of 
others can only be directly known by subjective declaration which, by virtue of self-
authentication, cannot be totally and objectively disproven. Moreover, Massumi’s concept of the 
supernormal within biotic agents demonstrates the individuality that permits evolutionary 
changes in behavior; these changes, sprouting from the individual level, allude directly to an 
interpretation of all biotic agents that shows room for individual agency that is founded in 
individualized intentions and interests. Narveson identifies concerns over objectifying 
intentionality and accepts whatever consequences flow from a cursory demarcation of rational 
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and irrational.117 In line with the critical aim of this work, we do not accept such theorizing. Thus 
we see a priori how reason fails to operate as a foundational criterion for libertarianism; 
moreover, when we consider the practical use of this criterion we see it collapse onto a 
foundation of minimalism in a similar fashion as we saw the life-planning criterion collapse. 
 When considering Narveson’s formulation of reason and focus on actions, the question of 
discernibility appears primary. Narveson appears to dictate that we simply need “some idea” of 
the intentions underlying one’s actions to discern whether such actions arise from the application 
of reason or, otherwise, merely arise as robotic responses to stimuli.118 Yet, the degree to which 
the intentions of actions must be discernible is ungrounded; does an educated guess suffice, or is 
scientific thoroughness a necessity? Going with Narveson’s concept of reason, we are inclined to 
reject the latter and question how ‘informed’ the former must truly be. Yet, there is an objective 
limit of how informed any outside observer may be, insomuch as the observer is not a subjective 
mirror of their subject but an alternate subject altogether. When considering the prudentialist 
criterion of reason, then, we must ask to whom the standard of discernibility falls. Narveson fails 
to identify an authoritative observer, but his conception of reason lends credence to the view that 
intentions must be discernible by other actors generally. While this view may hold in societal 
context, it is surely limited by cultural heterogeneity. Could a random American man understand 
the intentions of a random Japanese woman in any given scenario? It is doubtful, as both operate 
within different contextual understandings of particular gestures, actions, and interactions. Of 
course, base intentions (such as the drive for food/water) could be more readily discernible, but 
such base intentions are by default implicit within the behavior of all living things, including 
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nonhumans. And so, the question becomes who must be able to discern one’s actions in order to 
declare one reasonable and thus deserving of full moral standing? Given the underlying social 
embeddedness inherent to libertarian freedom, we are inclined to accept that one’s intentions 
must be somewhat discernible to those within the community, insomuch as such is necessary to 
ensure reciprocal adherence to the NIP and NAP. Moreover, the objective indiscernibility of 
complex intentions within humans requires libertarianism utilize a minimalist conception of 
intentions to function – the simplicity of these intentions bars categorical separation between 
human and nonhuman, as all living entities display base intentions pertinent to survival. 
Being as the intentions of moral agents cannot be objectively verified, we find any 
scientific argument regarding individual intentions as fundamentally incapable of aiding the 
discussion of reason and morality insomuch as the former remains normatively unquantifiable 
within libertarian theory. And so, when considering reason and intentions, we find by necessity a 
reliance on only the simplest of intentions that are inherent to all biotic agents. Thus, similar to 
the life-planning criterion, the criterion of reason collapses under critical scrutiny due to its 
inevitable reliance on minimalist conceptions of intentions.  
Prudentialism and Moral Standing 
Beyond these main criteria is the broader theoretical question of the relationship between 
capacities and moral standing generally. For while every varied formulation of reason could be 
identified and faced with our ecological conditions, the overarching question concerning the 
moral significance of the relationship between these formulations and moral standing would 
remain wanting. And so, in this brief section we shall consider exactly this question.  
 When considering the original quandary of this project, can nonhumans possess self-
ownership and acquire full moral standing, several logistical and metaphysical questions 




decide, and why they may decide. The question of why any individual may decide is particularly 
fitting of our libertarian focus, insomuch as the anti-authority disposition of libertarianism calls 
to question any assertion of authority, particularly when concerning such core fundamentals such 
as individual liberty and political rights. These concerns are of paramount importance in light of 
our current contemplation. For while we have already discussed the main outgrowths of 
prudentialism, the capacities for life-planning and reason and their reliance on minimalism, we 
have faltered in explaining exactly why these conceptions (or any conceptions) should be 
considered worthwhile in the libertarian mindset. In praxis, there appears one prime rationale: 
individuals within libertarian society must conform (at the lowest level) to certain framework 
realities which constitute their reality; if pluralism regarding moral standing were permitted, no 
true system of justice could survive and individuals would question the supposed-to-be implicit 
reciprocity of their society, weakening adherence to NAP/NIP in the long run. Yet, when 
gathered to agree upon a set of criteria for moral standing, these libertarian individuals 
nonetheless may question the authority of these criteria. Traditionally, with the 
human/nonhuman dichotomy assumed, there was little need, either in real theorizing or 
imaginary town halls, to settle these questions. In the context of our discussion, however, these 
questions are unavoidable.  
 In the fecund diversity of life on earth, then, the question regarding the significance of 
specific capacities to moral standing may be reframed: why should one species possess the 
prerogative to declare the conditions for moral standing? Consider any pluralistic democracy 
with a decently heterogeneous population. Would it permissible for one group – say, religious 
fundamentalists – to declare the specific capacity (religious adherence) required for moral 




to-arms of libertarians, particularly for Rothbardians. Indeed, the hefty authority of the individual 
within libertarianism is a direct counter to such abuses of societal authority. And so, when 
expanded to consider the immense biodiversity of our world, the question of authority vis-à-vis 
criteria selection remains unresolved.  
 More important than the question of authority, or rather the more immediate concern 
which offshoots this question, is the problematic question of why any particular criteria should 
appropriately signify an a priori relationship to moral standing. In using criteria founded in life-
planning or reason, theorists declare such criteria as necessary for a worthwhile existence; 
indeed, Nozick directly questions the purposiveness of a life devoid of conceptual integration. 
The problem with this theorizing is that it intrinsically upholds as a standard of comparison a 
recognizably human life. Humans require capacity A, B, or C to have a meaningful life, it is 
argued; yet is this not tautological and anthropocentrically biased?  
 In light of this discussion, consider the myriad and variegated capacities of nonhumans 
that man uniquely lacks. The conscious perception of full sensory range is a dramatic example. 
Humans cannot, naturally, see many portions of the light spectrum, hear many frequencies of 
sound, or smell prey over a stretch of miles. Most readers and theorists will question what these 
capacities have to do with moral standing; they are irrelevant to human life and, further, don’t 
mean the same to a human existence as does other capacities such as abstract reasoning. Yet it is 
precisely this inapplicability of the capacity-standing relationship to the human experience which 
illuminates the fundamental flaw of selecting anthropocentrically-fundamental capacities for 
moral standing. Whatever capacities we demarcate as explicitly meaningful for human existence 




dichotomy; rather, it demonstrates the consequences of one isolated group self-selecting criteria 
based on their conceptions of the good life to the exclusion of other agents.  
 And so, when considering alternate capacities related to the attainment of moral standing 
not discussed here, the natural question manifests: why do these capacities truly relate to moral 
standing? Does a whale need posses an identifiably human existence before it may be considered 
a full moral agent? Why does one species get to lord its formation of life as superior to others, by 
virtue of selecting the criteria by which such superiority may be granted? It is dangerously 
circular reasoning; dangerous not only to open and fair analysis, but for the trillions 
(quadrillions?) of nonhuman individuals currently unprotected by libertarianism and (as we’ll 
discuss shortly) the development of a libertarian society. This is the critical flaw of prudentialist 
autonomy within libertarianism: agents of full moral standing may choose whichever form of life 
they wish (within NAP/NIP confines) and thus are not a priori destined to select a recognizably 
human life; therefore, the use of criteria founded in the goals of such a human life are circularly 
anthropocentric and nonobjective – clear violations of the conditions of fair analysis and variety 
and non-interference. And so, with prudentialism critically impaired, we recognize minimalist 
autonomy as the necessary formulation for a logically consistent libertarian theory.  Before 
exploring the integration of minimalist autonomy within libertarianism, however, we must 
sidetrack momentarily to discuss the most famous and seminal criterion relating to nonhuman 
moral standing – suffering – and its inapplicability within libertarianism. Afterward, a short 
discussion on egoist morality will present critical responses to the question of “even if I agree, 




Suffering and Moral Standing 
Singer famously argued in Animal Liberation119 that the capacity for suffering extends beyond 
humans to all living entities; in a utilitarian fashion, then, the suffering of all capable entities 
should be weighted equally so as to prevent undue suffering and pain. While these arguments 
helped found mainstream animal rights literature, the concerns of Nozick (originally aimed at 
Bentham) point to an inherent intractability vis-à-vis this capacity and individual moral standing. 
Foremost, Nozick – along with all libertarians by default – reject the non-rights utilitarian 
approach of Singer; the focus is intently on individual moral standing and the access to principles 
of justice such standing provides. From this individualized focus flow other concerns of Nozick 
which rightfully dismiss the capacity for suffering as a criterion of moral standing within 
libertarianism 
 Utilizing the dual thought experiments of the experience and transformation machines, 
Nozick points to the immense difficulty in determining what matters for a life as a rationale for 
rejecting the capacity for suffering. By employing the experience machine – a machine that 
could theoretically allow individuals to completely feel whichever life experience they wished – 
Nozick points that more contextual components to an event matter beyond the event itself.120 An 
individual would likely not utilize the machine indefinitely as the experiences would lack the 
contextual holism of actually doing or engaging with an event. A transformation machine, which 
could alter individuals into the type of person they wish to be, would similarly lack incentive. 
What Nozick appears to hint at within these thought experiments is some form of unarticulated 
agency – the will to engage in such experiences and to change oneself matters significantly. This 
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is the disjoint between experiences endured and experiences created, a gap only identifiable 
when one can experience virtually the components of a life. In this way, a life spent in such 
machines would lack some form of meta-integration based on individual commitment. 
Considering the capacity for suffering, Nozick presses these contemplations toward the 
inevitable result: we don’t know fully what matters for human lives (possibly some form of 
agency), so how can we declare what matters fully for nonhuman lives?121 Thus, rather than 
directly disqualify suffering as a requisite capacity for moral standing, Nozick asks for validation 
of why such a capacity fits best a framework of Lockean individual rights. Suffering is 
invalidated as a criterion, however, when one acknowledges that suffering inevitably collapses 
with reason and life-planning due to its similar practical dependence on behavioral/intentional 
analysis. Singer’s conception of the capacity for suffering inevitably requires some criterion for 
determining suffering. Regardless the criterion selected for suffering (demonstrates discomfort, 
possess a nervous system, can cry, etc.) this criterion inevitably rely on some interpretation of 
behavior, thus falling prey to the criticisms earlier lodged at the criteria of life-planning and 
reason.  
The Question of Egoist Morality 
 
While the earlier sections identified faults in prudentialist autonomy, there remains still an apt 
terrain of conceptual consideration untouched. For, even if one was wholly convinced of the 
arguments laid forth thus far, there still remains one straightforward question: why bother? For a 
political theory solidified on the individuality of moral agents and their life decisions, where is 
the impetus, the call-to-arms, of why the previous considerations should be fully absorbed by a 
                                                
 




self-interested libertarian? Even if one agrees to the logic displayed here, one remains uncertain 
as to the bite of the normative consequences. When considering animal rights, Narveson posed 
this very question in the form of egoist morality.122 Egoist morality argues that morality follows 
a self-interested calculation similar to other forms of self-interested decision making – i.e. what 
is moral is determined by what is directly beneficial to the self-interested subject. Although not 
adhering to an egoist morality himself, Narveson is correct to identify this question as necessary 
for libertarian scholarship; as the predominant bastion of self-interested rationality, 
libertarianism may be the foremost contender for adherents to egoist moral judgments. And so, 
for a theory hell-bent on securing individual liberty above all other goods, the question of egoist 
morality is paramount. Why should the libertarian be convinced, personally, of accepting the 
logic and arguments laid forth in this discussion? In contemplating this dilemma, I have arrived 
at two responses. 
 The first response to the question of moral egoism concerns the true appropriateness of 
the question within the libertarian framework. While it may be rightly argued that the libertarian 
credo lends itself to egoistical rationality in the moral realm, the logical structure of libertarian 
theory suggests otherwise. Indeed, one characteristic distinction of this structure is its 
commitment to rational argumentation; Rothbard describes this commitment as central to the 
libertarian, who, by default, “sees his own position as virtually the only consistent one, consistent 
on behalf of the liberty of every individual”123 The strength of the libertarian argument, for 
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Rothbard, arises from its adherence to logical consistency and rational argumentation; there is no 
exemptions of logic nor truly special cases which do not arise naturally from prevailing logical 
argumentation. Rothbard sums this further, arguing that “[t]he libertarian, in short, insists on 
applying the general moral law to everyone, and makes no special exemptions for any person or 
group.”124 Other prominent libertarian scholars – Nozick, Narveson, Vallentyne – take particular 
care to ensure a consistent flow of logic to build their respective nuanced forms of libertarianism, 
each adhering to the same rigorous questioning of assumptions and accumulation of rational 
arguments. Indeed, Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia, can be viewed as a direct 
demonstration of such a logical adherence as mandated by Rothbard. And so, in considering the 
question of egoist morality, the first retort must be the exclusion of such moral calculation from 
the realm of libertarian theory. For the libertarian who, upon agreeing with new rational 
arguments, fails to consider such agreement as a self-generated impetus for change to maintain 
logical consistency within their worldview is not truly a libertarian in the academic sense. Of 
course, libertarians may disagree with the arguments of this work, as this work has disagreed 
with the arguments of other libertarian scholars; however, such is not the question at hand. A 
secondary characteristic, that of the inherent social embeddedness within libertarianism, also 
precludes the use of egoist morality; the necessity of self-restraint to adhere to the reciprocal 
demands of the NAP/NIP makes one incapable of utilizing a moral egoist calculation. A may find 
it advantageous to steal from or kill B, and the moral egoist may engage in killing for that 
benefit; however, in doing so A directly and completely surrenders the title of libertarian. Thus, 
when considering Narveson’s question of egoist morality, we may first respond that such a 
                                                
 




question should, by default, be exempt from libertarian theory as the libertarian’s commitment to 
logical consistency and reciprocity should override uncontrolled self-interestedness. Were this 
not the case, Nozick would not have considered the far-reaching implications of his entitlement 
theory of justice nor acknowledged the admissibility of a Principle of Rectification within 
libertarian theory.  
 The second retort to Narveson’s question of moral egoism speaks more directly to the 
question at hand, and ignores the concerns of the previous retort. For if we allow that libertarian 
theory permits such egoistic moral judgments, there remains a persuasive reason for the egoists 
to accept the arguments and tenants of ecological libertarianism. To unpack this reason, let us 
begin by refreshing ourselves to the primary goal of a libertarian society: mass adherence to the 
principles of non-aggression and non-interference, so as to allow maximum self-determination 
free from violent intrusion and control.125 All libertarian societies demand peace and stability, so 
as to maximize free agents’ realms of action, production, and trade. Violence and domination 
prove the ultimate sins for the libertarian, regardless enacted by individual persons or collective 
organizations.126 And so the libertarian, in aiming to promote her self-interest and long-term 
objectives, promotes peace and stability over aggression and dominance. Yet, the reality of 
violence and egoist mindsets is such that, in promoting peace, libertarians are bound naturally to 
construct a minimalist state – this is the overarching claim of Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and 
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Utopia.127 This aspect of libertarianism is fundamental to the actualization of libertarian aims. 
Now, in response to the moral egoist, we may connect domination of nonhumans to this 
overarching goal of libertarian theory.  
 As Horkheimer and Adorno address in their Dialectic of Enlightenment, the major 
premise of Enlightenment rationality – the forbearer of classical liberalism and libertarian theory 
– was the demystification of the natural world; as scientific understanding progressed, man’s 
control over the environment exponentially grew.128 Weather, agriculture, technology – 
gradually the collective facets of the world fell from the hands of deities into the hands of Man, 
with unprecedented developments resulting. Moreover, Man began to question himself – his 
psychology, his sociology, his politics – and began similarly working toward mastery of himself. 
In this way, the controlling nature of the man-environment relationship expanded into the 
relationship of Man to himself – leading inevitably to the horrific consequences of the Twentieth 
Century. As humanity began seeing Man as yet another object, it began contemplating the means 
by which that object may be manipulated and controlled. The Rothbardian libertarian would 
interject here that such dominance has historically been conducted by the State, and most 
libertarians and anarchists (the line which Rothbard walks) would be bound to agree. However, 
the state as a collective of individuals nonetheless demonstrates the corruption of individual men 
against other men. Similar arguments have been presented throughout U.S. legal history129, with 
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courts frequently recognizing the relationship between man’s treatment of animals and man’s 
treatment of his fellows. And so the dominating relationship of man to nonhumans can be seen as 
linked to dominating relationships between men. Recalling the purpose of the libertarian society 
as generating a space of non-aggression and non-interference, we can see how directly the 
interests of ecological libertarianism tie to the fundamental interests of all libertarians. In 
pressing to remove the variables of violence and domination from society, the libertarian is 
remiss if not considering the foremost generator of such variables within society, Man’s 
domination of nature. And so, it follows that a libertarian society truly enamored with its task of 
a maintaining a political environment of non-domination and maximum individual liberty would 
be required to reconsider Man’s relationship to nonhumans. In expanding the cadre of moral 
agents to include nonhumans, a theory of ecological libertarianism would work directly toward 
increasing the likelihood of that idyllic libertarian society forming. This answers the question of 
egoist morality by expanding the limitations of self-interested calculations.130 For one’s 
domination of nonhumans for the purpose of food production would fulfill one’s self-interested 
desires of particular consumption practices, ensuring a relative short-term gain; however, one’s 
admittance of nonhumans as moral agents eliminates the base relationship of violence which 
permeates into human-human interactions. The apologist of egoist morality may balk at the 
consequences, arguing such to not truly befit an egoist calculation, but this would again be a 
misjudgment. As discussed earlier, individual liberty within libertarian theory requires social 
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reciprocation of the principles of non-aggression and non-intervention.131 Thus, the rational 
egoist, in aiming to maximize his individual gains while cognizant of this reciprocation 
necessity, must logically yield to the reality posited by ecological libertarianism: by 
cooperatively generating a society which abstains from human-nonhuman domination, the egoist 
guarantees himself a societal context which maximizes his individual liberty, insomuch as the 
restraint from violence against nonhumans permeates into human-human interactions. In 
avoiding a paranoiac livelihood, which is a self-generated diminished liberty, the egoist would 
rationally agree to these terms so as to secure the greatest (in terms of individual liberty) 
environment for his own life. This argument is in line with Narveson’s arguments concerning the 
individual generation and practical function of morality (discussed further in Part IV). And so, 
when entertaining the question of egoist moral calculations, we may respond that the ultimate 
benefit of adhering to an ecological libertarianism greatly outweighs the benefit of not so 
adhering, and thus the moral egoist would inevitably (if fully rational) commit to ecological 
libertarianism, even if for overwhelmingly selfish reasons.  
 The question of moral egoism is an important one for libertarians. Although libertarian 
theory mandates loyalty to rationality and logical consistency, the self-interested stigma of 
libertarianism permeates ideological discussions via questions of moral egoism. And so, while 
libertarians commit to consistency and rationality over egregious selfishness, the question 
nonetheless deserves contemplation even if only for persuasive reasons. When examining the 
long-term goals of a libertarian life, however, it becomes abundantly clear how the arguments 
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and conclusions of an ecological libertarianism would be rationally accepted by libertarians, 
even if only for the selfish reason of creating an ideal libertarian reality in which one could enjoy 
maximal individual liberty.  
Summation 
In this chapter we discussed the failures of prudentialist autonomy and its two primary 
expressions, life-planning and reason; the inapplicability of Singer’s concept of suffering within 
libertarian theory; the question of egoist morality; and, through these examinations made 
headway for the foundation of an ecological libertarianism. Before turning to the construction 
effort, however, it will likely do some good to survey the land we have conquered thus far. This 
section will briefly highlight the arguments of the previous chapters and take stock of the main 
points of our discussion.  
 At the beginning of this work, we identified the main tenants and logical structure of 
contemporary libertarian theory. Politics is comprised of the myriad interactions between 
individual moral agents. These agents must first possess autonomy to earn self-ownership and 
possess individual liberty and earn protection from interference (NIP) and aggression (NAP) 
from other individuals. Throughout libertarian scholarship, then, we saw that nonhumans were 
considered “economic land”132 and lacked moral status and individual liberty. We then discussed 
the conceptual uncertainty of autonomy as providing an opening for theoretical examination into 
the question of nonhuman self-ownership and moral standing within libertarian theory.  
 In Part II, we identified the inherent social embeddedness within libertarianism along 
with non-anthropocentric ecological conditions that culminated into a framework useful for 
                                                
 




evaluating criteria of prudentialist autonomy within libertarianism. This framework served to 
create a rational and non-anthropocentric arena for argumentation that privileged no traditional 
assumptions accepted by contemporary libertarian scholars. Most importantly, these conditions 
arose directly in the interest of argumentative fairness as well as from undernourished portions of 
libertarian theory which, as we have shown, have great worth fundamentally.  
 In this chapter, we identified the main conceptualizations of autonomy – minimalist and 
prudentialist – and applied the ecologically conditioned framework to the two primary 
expressions of prudentialist autonomy within libertarianism. This application served to 
demonstrate the prudentialism’s critical reliance on minimalism in praxis; furthermore, it 
provided critical insights into the logical inapplicability of abstract capacities as criteria for 
autonomy within libertarianism, thereby demonstrating the necessarily minimalist nature of 
libertarian criteria. We then examined the well-known concept of suffering and its inapplicability 
within libertarianism despite its ecologically mindful foundation, and answered the question of 
egoist morality.  
With our route through libertarianism now identified, we are set to consider the 
consequences of our argumentation and of nonhuman self-ownership. The final chapter is that 
consideration. We will discuss how, despite the radical nature of our discussion and critiques, an 
ecological libertarianism retains the great backbone and limbs of contemporary libertarianism 
theoretically despite the dramatic differences in praxis. After identifying the critical flaws in 
prudentialist autonomy criteria, we have come to the point where we must consider the impacts 









Now that we have examined the critical flaws of prudentialist autonomy within libertarian 
theory, the time has come to identify and discuss the impacts of utilizing minimal autonomy 
within libertarianism; more directly, the time has come to discuss ecological libertarianism. This 
final chapter will begin by discussing what is entailed within minimal autonomy and what 
consequences follow. Next, we will examine some areas of complication and potential critiques 
against ecological libertarianism. Our discussion will conclude with connections to extant 
literature and a brief discussion of the avenues of future research opened by this project. From 
this rough sketching of ecological libertarianism, we find solutions to the question of nonhuman 
moral status, human judicial obligations regarding nonhumans, and a route for libertarianism to 
seriously (if indirectly) address important environmental issues.  
Foundations 
In discrediting prudentialist autonomy as a viable criterion for moral standing within 
libertarianism, we defaulted to utilizing minimal autonomy as the criteria by which moral 
standing may be decided. Recalling Lipson and Vallentyne’s definition of minimal autonomy, 
we see the filter of moral standing as centering on the capacity to select and act upon desires, 
broadly speaking. In keeping with the conditions of Part II, we see vast room within this minimal 
standard for the attainment of full moral standing by nonhuman agents. But what does this mean 
for libertarian theory? Surprisingly, and paradoxically, the transition to minimal autonomy does 
little to the theoretical and logical structure of libertarian theory; yet, in praxis, this transition 





 The theoretical and logical structure of libertarianism, outlined in Part I as beginning with 
autonomy and ending with NIP/NAP protections, is fundamentally unchanged following our 
transition to minimal autonomy. Throughout our discussion particular focus was placed on 
critically functioning within this structure to identify the inconsistencies that surrounded the 
human/nonhuman dichotomy. Thus, although altering the criterion of autonomy at the base of 
this logical structure, all remaining aspects remain unaltered. This is good news. This is good 
news because when considering ecological libertarianism in reference to other schools of 
libertarian theory we can find immediate similarities that are both inherent and fundamental to 
libertarianism broadly. And so, we have not isolated ourselves from libertarian peers through our 
conversation; although the dramatic practical impacts may do the isolating for us.   
 While keeping the same libertarian structure, ecological libertarianism nonetheless 
provides drastic impacts on individuals and societies abiding by libertarian rationalities. Such is 
the natural consequence of expanding the moral community. However, these impacts may be 
among the greatest felt by contemporary human society; a great deal of our human existence is 
predicated on the domination of nonhumans. What does it mean, then, to accept the argument 
that nonhumans have full moral standing? There are two immediate concerns that arise, both of 
which center upon the NIP/NAP protections within libertarianism. First is the question “what 
does NIP/NAP protection mean for nonhumans?” Second is the question of “how can we 
reconcile NIP/NAP protection with non-predictable nonhuman behavior?”  
Question 1: What does NIP/NAP protection mean for Nonhumans? 
The application of the principles of non-aggression and non-interference is a relatively simple 
manner when within the realm of human-human relations. When expanded to encompass 
nonhuman agents, however, we see dramatic impacts on human society. To ease our 




within these principles. When within the traditional non-ecological libertarian society, we see 
these principles as outlining a simple doctrine of negative liberty: A may not aggress against or 
interfere in the life of B, unless B aggresses or interferes with the life of A or C.133 Considering 
nonhumans, then, we see essentially the extension of this doctrine beyond the human realm and 
into human-nonhuman relationships. And so, the first major consequence of ecological 
libertarianism is the disallowance of trafficking nonhumans.134 This is obviously a massive and 
devastating impact of ecological libertarianism. Many will, at this point, question the rational 
applicability of this doctrine in light of this practical impact; surely, our evolution into omnivores 
demonstrates the large role of meat consumption within human life. The next section will 
address this apparent irreconcilability, showing this impact to drastically affect only the 
production aspect of human meat consumption (ranching, farming, etc.).  The application of 
NIP/NAP protection to nonhumans thus brings about massive societal changes, by 
acknowledging nonhumans as self-owning agents with negative liberties. It should be noted, 
however, that impacts of similar magnitude are permitted within traditional libertarian theory as 
well. The permissibility of such dramatic impacts can be found in Nozick’s Entitlement Theory 
of Justice.  
 Countering Rawlsian and other theories of justice which focus on end-state distributions 
throughout society, Nozick builds a theory of libertarian justice centered around just 
entitlements. For this, Nozick employs two primary principles; the Principle of Acquisition, 
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134 Note that this disallowance follows, logistically and normatively, the contemporary normative disallowance of 
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which would theoretically outline the normative terms of justly acquiring property (such as not 
through theft, fraud, etc.) and the Principle of Transfer, which would outline the normative terms 
of justly transferring property between individuals. From adherence to these principles then, 
emerge a just distribution regardless any apparent disparities between individuals.135 Thus, 
Nozick’s conception of an entitlement-based theory of justice argues that, so long as property 
was acquired and transferred justly no distribution of property in society could be deemed 
normatively unsatisfactory. However, as history demonstrates, there can be cases where 
individuals neglect either of these just principles, and thereby commit an injustice. For this, 
Nozick briefly outlines a Principle of Rectification; this principle arises when an individual holds 
property that was attained unjustly (i.e. taken through violence, stealing, etc.).136 This principle 
essentially maintains that societal redistribution is allowable to correct past injustices in either 
the acquisition or transfer of property between individuals. Nozick fails to elaborate greatly as to 
the logistics of such a principle, arguing vaguely that “past injustices might be so great as to 
make necessary in the short run a more extensive state in order to rectify them.”137 And so, 
whereas the impacts of NIP/NAP protections for nonhumans may be substantial, this is allowable 
within the libertarian framework of Nozick’s entitlement theory of justice. Moreover, with 
libertarianism emphasizing a practical morality, it can be seen that such dramatic redistribution is 
already problematic within libertarianism before the advent of nonhuman moral status. For 
contemporary societies, should they suddenly and unanimously be compelled to abide libertarian 
logic, would be hard-pressed to find an adequate mode of rectification for current property 
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holdings – how would the United States rectify the gains stolen through centuries of slavery, for 
example? Indeed, Nozick backs away significantly from the normative and logistical 
considerations which surround the Principle of Rectification. With the liberties and lives of 
millions of individuals on the line, however, we cannot help but require a further unpacking of 
this Principle. Without pretense of accomplishing this gigantic feat, I can offer a one particular 
aspect of this unpacking which necessitate further investigation. 
 The question of the consequences of millennia of human-nonhuman interaction and its 
relevance to the Principle of Rectification are paramount. For while the initial argument of 
releasing nonhumans from captivity logically follows their attainment of moral personhood, 
there are nonetheless significant consequences of the relational history between humans and 
nonhumans. Nonhumans can, and have, vaccinate humans against various illnesses throughout 
time; of course, human control over nonhumans constitutes the largest ongoing eugenics project 
in history. With these factors known, how can we simply dictate that humans remove linkages to 
nonhumans – particularly considering the ‘discovery’ of social-ecological embeddedness within 
libertarianism? It seems paradoxical. Moreover, how could or would we rectify a millennia of 
manipulation? First, we must consider Narveson’s contemplation regarding slavery. In 
evaluating the normative content of a hypothetical reality, wherein slaves are genetically 
engineered (somehow) to enjoy their servitude, Narveson articulates that the initial transition into 
slavery, predating the full control over such slaves, necessarily involved injustice.138 When the 
first slave was taken and altered to enjoy servitude, his autonomy was rejected and NIP/NAP 
protections unjustly rescinded. This similarly applies to nonhumans. While we may argue that 
                                                
 




farm and labor animals have been bred specifically to enjoy (or at least permit) such use of their 
labor and bodies, this does not retroactively justify the removal of liberty first needed to 
accomplish this task. Just as the eugenics program of human slavery fails to justify slavery in the 
modern era, so to must the relationships between humans and nonhumans not become mired in 
eugenically-derived moral justification. Thus, we have doubled-down on the commitment to 
releasing nonhumans; but the question of how to properly rectify their unjust acquisition and 
transference as property remains. After acknowledging the moral impetus to rectify the situation, 
however, we are left with normative and logistical confusion. What do nonhumans want? Do 
they want anything as compensation? How would we know? Could we? The best sketch I can 
articulate at this time, in keeping with our ecological conditions, would be conscious restraint 
over the expansion of human society at the cost of nonhuman survival. This could be 
pragmatically expressed in two main ways. First, we can release all animals into the wilderness, 
restrain the growth of human civilization, and let the dynamic processes of nature figure out the 
ecological balance. This seems unsatisfactory, insomuch as the theory which declares 
nonhumans to have moral standing would be sending great numbers of them to die in unfamiliar 
habitats. The second, and normatively more satisfying, route would be the creation of great 
sanctuaries. These sanctuaries would necessarily involve great resources, efforts, and oversight, 
and would serve only for previously captive animals (not as a repository for nonhuman nature). 
While this would appear an intensive effort, the history of political emancipation would suggest 
such intensity to be an integral aspect of such expansions of the moral community. While Nozick 
backs away from considering these aspects of the Principle of Rectification, this serves as a 
detriment to libertarians committed to the project of building a libertarian society which, by 




And so, when Rothbard asks “...will anyone deny full title to a horse to the man who finds and 
domesticates it,” ecological libertarians say yes. Nozick painted the target, and it is the task of 
libertarians, generally and in the context of ecological libertarianism, to take the plunge fully and 
highlight this hidden gem within libertarian theory.  
Question 2: Nonhuman violence and the NIP/NAP 
The cautious reader has likely questioned the extension of NIP/NAP protections to nonhumans at 
various points throughout our discussion. How can nonhumans be given negative freedoms when 
they are fundamentally incapable of abstractly reciprocating those freedoms? How can 
omnivorous humans ignore the benefits of and evolutionary drive for meat consumption? How 
can humans and nonhumans both have negative liberties and yet have the theory declared 
‘ecological’? The answer to these questions lies within the libertarian discussion of self-defense 
and Nozick’s contemplation of innocent victims.  
 Throughout our discussion of libertarianism, there has been continued reliance on the 
simple doctrine of reciprocal adherence to the principles of non-aggression and non-interference. 
This simple doctrine has, in our discussion, carried continually the caveat of self-defense; that is, 
A may aggress or interfere with B in self-defense if B is originally aggressing or interfering with 
A. This is an intuitive categorical exception to the prohibitions of the NIP and NAP. Narveson 
details this right to self-defense nicely by connecting one’s self-property rights to the right to 
defend such self-property: “... the right to resist (violence) is precisely what having a right of 
safety of person is, if it is anything at all.”139 Nozick similarly recognizes self-defense as an 
exception to NIP/NAP reciprocity, extending the conversation to include questions of innocent 
                                                
 




threats.140 Individuals who threaten or aid in threatening an individual while not consciously 
intending to do so constitute innocent threats; Nozick describes the category nicely in the 
following situation: 
If someone picks up a third party and throws him at you down at the bottom of a 
deep well, the third party is innocent and a threat; had he chosen to launch himself 
at you in that trajectory, he would be an aggressor.141  
 
Nozick maintains that different rules apply for the consideration of these innocent threats, but 
nonetheless provides room within the right to self-defense for the use of force against them. 
Interestingly, this may lead to two individuals fighting as innocent threats mutually in self-
defense. This is important for ecological libertarians, as the fight for self-preservation can be 
recast as a battle of self-defense between innocent threats. When considering the questions above 
relating to nonhuman adherence to NIP/NAP protections, we must seek our answer from within 
the libertarian exception that is self-defense. I contend that if we expand the category of self-
defense slightly in the theoretics we find numerous pragmatic resolutions.  
 If we augment the category of self-defense so as to include a provision allowing self-
preservation, the questions of NIP/NAP reciprocity and adherence begin to dissipate. Indeed, one 
could easily articulate Narveson’s earlier connection of self-property rights and self-defense as 
emerging from a rational self-interest in self-preservation. The key, for this expansion, is to 
maintain a high standard for what self-preservation entitles. Just as the Confederacy could not 
utilize self-preservation to uphold slavery, libertarians cannot utilize self-preservation to 
maintain nonhuman enslavement or domination. Yet, where and when necessary, individuals 
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may consume nonhumans as necessary to maintain self-preservation.142 This right to self-
preservation within self-defense is not limited in this manner, however; nonhumans would 
similarly be granted the acknowledged right of self-preservation when utilizing violence against 
humans. Thus, the question of how we may apply NIP/NAP protections to nonhumans while 
acknowledging the omnivorous nature of Man and the non-reciprocating (in abstract) nature of 
nonhumans is resolved by acknowledging both nonhumans and humans as maintaining a right to 
self-defense which includes self-preservation. Although nonhumans fail to abstractly or 
contractually agree to the terms, we see easy room for both parties’ adherence in praxis. The 
large normative question, then, becomes distinguishing dire necessity for the purposes of 
consuming nonhumans. Put simply, the criteria for dire necessity would need to be founded in 
rational criteria of proven scarcity; there is a distinction between eating a deer for pleasure and 
eating a deer as the last gasp for survival – a distinction which requires a logical criteria to 
properly distinguish. This criteria will have to wait for future consideration, however. Another 
criteria which must be constructed in response to these arguments is that of distinguishing 
between proper recourses for self-preservation. If a man has the choice between hunting a deer, 
catching a fish, or shooting an elephant, how would he reasonably distinguish the moral 
difference between them? Is there a difference? The likely response will be that there is no 
difference normatively, and that choice will depend upon the context and reasoning of the 
individual.  
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Complications & Critiques 
As with any political theory of justice, ecological libertarianism is not a theoretical panacea. 
There are, of course, areas of imperfection and weakness in which scholars may find ample room 
for critique. We would be remiss if we failed to identify beforehand some of these areas, and 
how they could challenge the work attempted thus far.  
Inter-Nonhuman Judicial Concerns  
Foremost is the question of interspecies violence. For in articulating a libertarian theory which 
acknowledges nonhumans as moral agents, we have expanded dramatically the recipients of 
justice. With our slight augmentation of self-defense, we have provided a baseline guide for 
human interactions with nonhumans: Human A may not interfere with or aggress against 
Nonhuman B so long as Nonhuman B does not aggress or interfere with Human A, unless 
absolutely necessary to preserve the life of Human A. There are some other issues with this 
dictum, but for the moment we may focus on the necessarily differentiated nature of this 
interaction. We have a guide for how Man should interact with nonhumans. We have a guide for 
how Man should interact with Man. Yet, these guides clearly cannot function on issues between 
nonhuman agents. If chimpanzee A attacks chimpanzee B and violates the NIP/NAP, is there 
cause for judicial concern? How would such a concern be normatively and logistically guided? 
There appears to be only one route around this complication. Libertarianism cannot demand 
individuals protect one another, lest their individual freedoms be trampled at the onset. Nozick, 
Narveson, and Rothbard all contend, however, that individuals may freely choose to protect one 
another should such protection be warranted and welcomed. Considering inter-nonhuman 
violence and our ecological conditions, it seems rational for this category to be ignored entirely 
by human society. We cannot know the complexity of the social actions between nonhumans, 




nonhumans definitely.143 While we have expanded the lens of libertarian judicial consideration, it 
would be a great overreach to examine such inter-nonhuman judicial concerns.  
Rectification 
While we previously identified the impacts of ecological libertarianism as theoretically allowable 
given Nozick’s principle of rectification, we nonetheless have myriad logistical and theoretical 
issues surrounding the employment of such a principle. How do you compensate nonhumans? 
Do we simply open the pens and cages and wait for all nonhumans to find placement in the 
natural world? What of the consequences of overcrowding, overgrazing, and other impacts of 
suddenly flooding ecosystems with innumerable new nonhumans? What of the fact that many 
nonhumans are not indigenous to the areas that they inhabit? These questions are difficult for 
logistics already; the normative discourse surrounding such logistics would seem 
insurmountable. I have no answer to these questions. It is likely that there can be no true answer 
to these questions. However, I can point to these questions as merely extensions of the problems 
of Nozick’s principle of rectification. Considering the end of slavery in the mid-19th Century 
brings about similar questions of high magnitude: how do we redistribute the wealth acquired 
through/stolen from slaves? This is clearly a field of libertarianism which demands further 
contemplation, the size and direction of which lie outside the bounds of this project. However, 
we can understand Nozick’s reluctance to outline such a rectification program as a result of 
pragmatic focus. Narveson portrays libertarianism as a practical morality, built on individual 
reasoning and action; with the demands of the Principle of Rectification so large and complex, it 
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makes sense for theorists and lay libertarians to neglect attending to it. It is inconvenient and 
impractical to establish a temporary massive government structure to evaluate the unjust 
acquisitions and redistribute throughout society. However, as is the theme of our discussion, 
convenience and tradition are unsuitable foundations for a normative theory built upon the 
sacrosanctity of individual liberty. While we cannot finalize the logistics of the Principle of 
Rectification, we can nonetheless press for its day in the sun and for libertarian theory to 
recognize the radical message and consequences inherent within such a principle. Relative to the 
question of nonhumans, however, at present the best we can say is that the complexities and 
problems surrounding the Principle of Rectification within ecological libertarianism are merely 
the continuation of the inherent problems within the task of correcting NAP/NIP violations via 
redistribution.  
Self-Preservation 
Similarly, conceptual issues regarding the expansion of self-defense to include self-
preservation144 may plague those open to the tenants of ecological libertarianism. The superficial 
argument is appealing: we keep livestock to ensure our preservation therefore the current system 
is not morally culpable. While this is historically true, it nonetheless falters within the libertarian 
framework. Because libertarianism is the counter to utilitarianism, there is no sacrifice-driven 
justification that can suffice to allow the removal of self-ownership and negative liberties. This is 
the same reason slavery, regardless the benefits, cannot be permitted in a libertarian society. 
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Where then, does the standard of self-preservation lie? I posit the standard must be quite high. 
Nonhumans cannot have their liberties curtailed continually for unnecessary or potentially 
necessary reasons. Consider cannibalism. Throughout mainstream America, cannibalism is 
scorned and wholly illegal. Yet, in situations of dramatic necessity (such as occurred with the 
Donner party) cannibalism is tolerated; tolerated not of lifestyle differences or freedoms, but 
tolerated as a necessary and dire decision. Intuitively, then, cannibalism is allowed albeit with a 
very high standard. The standard for self-preservation as it relates to consuming nonhumans can 
be placed at a similar position. The practical implication of this placement is the disallowance of 
ranching and herding but the allowance of necessary hunting. Of course, individuals may argue 
over situational applications of this standard; I leave the logistics of those arguments and their 
resolutions to another time.  
Children 
Selecting minimal autonomy as the necessary starting point of ecological libertarianism presents 
a particular difficulty when conceptualizing the placement of children within the moral 
community. Lipson and Vallentyne discuss this difficulty in practical terms.145 If a child refuses 
to go to school, do her parents infringe upon her liberty if she is sent there anyway? If a teenager 
runs away from home, are his rights trampled if he is returned involuntarily? Our necessary 
answers, by selecting minimal autonomy, is yes to both questions. How then, do we reconcile 
this with the natural tendency to control and develop one’s children? Parental rights are 
nonexistent within the minimal autonomy framework as ecological libertarianism constructs it. 
At present, there is no simple reconciliation. And so, by freeing nonhumans we have complicated 
                                                
 




the status of young humans. Unfortunately, this critique must remain unanswered. The best 
response we can provide is simply that children, similar to the principle of rectification, are a 
troubled category for libertarian theory; for even when prudentialism is utilized the distinction of 
when one has attained the ‘proper’ level of reason to be autonomous is contestable. Nonetheless, 
there are some avenues for potential reconciliation that can be sketched briefly. 
 Foremost is Narveson’s odd public-interest conception of children. Arguing that the pains 
inflicted on children may impact their current and future well-being, Narveson paints a potential 
avenue through which the rights of children may be upheld by society.146 This is furthered by 
Lipson and Vallentyne, who posit one conceptualization of children within libertarian theory as 
that of future rights-bearing adults. Narveson’s acknowledgment that children are “adults-in-
training” who will fulfill the roles and needs of society as has every generation before them.147 
However, this is a problematic approach for two reasons. First, it fails to operate within a 
minimalist framework, insomuch as the criteria for adulthood is clearly rooted in prudentialist 
conceptions of autonomy. Second, as a failure of prudentialist autonomy, this conception fails to 
capture the moment of transition into adulthood, and thus leaves us still questioning the 
normative judgments surrounding a teenage runaway’s rights.  
 An alternative route through the problem could perhaps be developed through the 
consideration of labor. Narveson identifies children as problematic for contractarianism and 
libertarianism, finding particular difficulty arising in the application of Lockean labor-based 
property rights.148 For libertarianism broadly, it is the mixing of labor with nature which creates 
                                                
 
146 Narveson, The Libertarian Idea, 274. 
147 Ibid, 271.  




property, and by the exertion of labor one acquires a title over the product of such mixing. Yet, 
this formulaic conception is problematized in the case of children; children are created through 
the mixing of labor, yet grow to produce individual subjectivity. We’ll discuss briefly three 
potential routes through this problematic area, finding the solution to rely upon future critical 
considerations of what constitutes labor.  
 The first resolution to the problem of children within the property-rights schema is the 
simplistic assertion that parents own their children. Most libertarians will take issue with this 
resolution; if this is true, can there ever be liberty? Are you born to follow the authority of family 
until such family dies? Are you only free in old age? What is the purpose of autonomy, reason, 
or any capacity if we are nonetheless normatively bound to the declarations of our physical 
creators? This resolution is simply too distasteful and contrary to libertarianism to entertain 
seriously.  
 The second potential resolution may be through categorical exception. Is the conception, 
delivery, and raising of children similar to other mixing of labor and nature? Or is there 
something particular about children, as future adults, which distinguishes them from other 
categories of moral personhood within libertarianism? This logic would likely follow the 
mistaken assumption that humans are not natural, and thus reproduction is a pure mixing of labor 
with labor. However, this would assume a metaphysical anti-naturalism which is contrary to the 
arguments of ecological libertarianism. Moreover, it breaks with the Rothbardian emphasis149 on 
logical constancy within libertarian reasoning. The fact that humans are natural entities, bound 
                                                
 




by similar reproductive functions to other nonhuman entities, casts serious doubts on this path as 
a means for resolving the problem of children within libertarian theory.  
 Finally, the question of children in libertarian theory may be resolved, or at least 
deferred, through the question of production. The mixing of labor with nature to create property 
has been argued as necessary for the survival and wellbeing of Man. Rothbard takes thread to 
establish property rights generally, arguing that “Man ... must own not only his own person, but 
also material objects for his control and use.”150Thus, we see a direct linkage between productive 
survival and property rights. Yet, children do no labor. They are provided for by guardians or 
they perish; hence the mammalian instinct of altruism. This is the crux of Narveson’s weak 
argument concerning the emotive concern for children and their care within human societies.151 
Regardless the emotive content, there is clearly a definitive dependence upon others inherent 
within childhood.152 Perhaps, then, we may consider utilizing a criteria of human labor which 
distinguishes children from adults. This criteria would need to define labor in terms of survival 
and property rights and be able to neatly categorize dependent children and independent adults. 
While this would appear to fall with prudentialism, this criteria could actually serve well in 
concert with Narveson’s public-interest foundation and the social embeddedness within 
libertarian theory. Perhaps, then, the hope of resolving the problem of children within libertarian 
theory, particularly in light of minimalist autonomy, can be found in the generation of labor 
necessary to achieve desires. With human society metaphysically a natural construct, this would 
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predicate the criteria of labor upon a societal conception of minimal labor necessary for survival. 
Thus, the issues before us can be resolved somewhat. Children, distinguished by their lack of 
survival labor, cannot work to achieve desired ends and therefore fail to hit the requirements of 
minimal autonomy. As the human environment continues to develop, the standard of survival 
labor within that environment will naturally change; consider a teenager seeking independence in 
1910, 1960, and today, and we can see different levels of survivability. While this criteria rests 
on a socially constructed criteria, it nonetheless follows the logic of reciprocity within libertarian 
theory. Moreover, following Narveson’s emphasis on the relate-ability of human children and 
our necessary restraint from considering inter-nonhuman judicial concerns, we find that this 
criteria can solely apply to human communities without making such an exception to libertarian 
logic.  
 While this final resolution appears a potentially promising route through the problem of 
children in libertarianism, greater analysis is needed before we can declare the case closed.  
While the question of children is complicated by accepting minimalist autonomy, we can see 
how the problem of children has plagued libertarianism well before such an expansion of the 
moral community. 
Pet Ownership 
Another area of potential contestation is the area of pet ownership. Thus far, we have argued 
against livestock ownership and other forms of animal enslavement as intolerable infringements 
upon nonhuman liberty. Must we, by extension, surrender our pets to the outdoors in hopes of 
reparation? Surprisingly, the answer is no.  
  First, recall that libertarians are not by default atomistic sociopaths. Libertarians are free 
to make friends and, furthermore, are free to self-limit their liberty in exchange for whatever they 




such a decision be made voluntarily, without coercion, and the decision does not violate 
NIP/NAP protections for others. Two individuals may surrender NAP/NIP protection in 
exchange for competing in an old-fashioned dual to the death. The point is that individuals, once 
granted NIP/NAP protections, may do a great many things within the confines of those 
protections for others. This greatly extends to friendships. Friends commonly lend property to 
one another and access property which only one individual has an actual claim over. This is a 
natural consequence of friendship if decided voluntarily. The elderly or infirm may voluntarily 
surrender self-ownership in certain cases (comatose, mental instability, etc.) to friends in 
exchange for certain decisions (DNRs, etc.). Thus, when considering pets, it could do some good 
to reframe the situation as one of interspecies friendship rather than interspecies ownership. 
Animals from decent homes (free of abuse, neglect, etc.) often return to those homes of their 
own volition. And, often in cities, animals will find and frequent individuals who provide 
food/shelter/love to them. While cognizant of the conditions in Part II, I find no reason why 
organic interspecies friendships should be terminated so as to secure the full liberty of either 
party. It would be tantamount to ending a happy human friendship so as to give your previous 
friend more liberty than they had while friends with you. Of course, this requires houses to 
provide well for their pets to mitigate the chances of the friendship being recast as domination. 
This undoubtedly will not suffice for the critical reader, who finds numerous questions manifest 
within this framing of pet ownership. However, at present this reframing serves well as a point of 
moderation between pet ownership as slavery on one hand and pet owners destroying the lives of 
their pets on the other. While admittedly unsatisfactory, it is yet another area which requires 




The Larger Conversation 
The implications of this project for the larger conversation within environmental political theory 
are numerous and significant. We will take some time now, at the end our discussion to detail 
these implications and how they may be absorbed within the broader scholarly dialogue.  
 Foremost, our discussion served well to solidify the logical consistency of libertarian 
theory. By opening a contestable area to critical examination, this project cemented the spirit of 
libertarian negative liberties and the myriad forms of lifestyle which flow therefrom; this is a 
significant step toward reifying libertarianism as a rational, consistent, and worthwhile political 
theory within the marketplaces of political theory and ideas.  
 More significantly, our discussion has – through the development of an ecological 
libertarianism – demonstrated the flaw inherent to arguments regarding classical liberalism’s 
inability to mitigate environmental problems. The common launchpad of environmental 
theorizing, that liberalism, broadly, promotes self-interest and instrumentalism too greatly to 
allow for solving environmental crises, is dismantled when we see that liberalism’s modern 
champion of self-interest and instrumentalism, libertarianism, can be radically opened for the 
inclusion of nonhuman moral status. By expanding the moral community to include nonhuman 
liberty, we find libertarianism as promoting through self-interest and NIP/NAP reciprocity the 
resolution of environmental problems at least theoretically. Thus, a frequent founding 
assumption of environmental theorizing is eliminated as a non-starter. Nonhumans may find 
great negative freedoms through critical examination of libertarian doctrine; as a consequence, 
liberalism’s inability to tackle environmental issues comes immediately into question.  
 Additionally, the insights of this project provide an intriguing frame through which 
questions of democracy may be addressed. Dryzek’s contemplation regarding incorporating 




this project; however, conceptualizing nonhumans through the ecological libertarian lens does 
allow for beneficial consideration of nonhuman desires broadly speaking. Of course, we cannot 
use this lens to articulate that nonhuman A agrees or disagrees with any particular policy option, 
yet we can utilize this lens to articulate that the negative liberties of nonhuman A cannot be 
trampled for anthropocentric gains; furthermore, when considering democracy in the vein of 
ecological libertarianism, utilitarian logic and policy is disallowed for nonhumans as well as 
humans. And so, while not solving environmental issues per se, the development of an 
ecological libertarianism does provide one conduit through which libertarians as well as other 
environmental theorists may conceptualize the placement of nonhumans cosmologically and 
politically.  
Environmental Implications 
Although we have taken some time already to discuss various areas in which the impacts of 
ecological libertarianism will be most notable, particularly in considering the Principle of 
Rectification and the role of children, we may take some time to briefly discuss another major 
area affected by ecological libertarianism: the environment. There are two primary frames 
through which we can identify the impacts of ecological libertarianism.  
 First, we can reexamine the previous split between right and left libertarian theory. Recall 
from Part I that left-libertarians maintain a communal relationship to the environment – 
resources are the property of all individuals to use for production and survival – while right-
libertarians maintain a first-come, first-serve policy of acquiring resources. Should either camp 
accept the arguments of ecological libertarianism, these perspectives would require dramatic 
reconsideration. Left-libertarians would need to consider the scope and intentionality of sharing 
resources within the moral community. How much and of what resources is each nonhuman 




insomuch as the expansion of the moral community necessitates a reconceptualization of labor. if 
a man finds a tree, and shapes it into a canoe it is his property solely. What labor do nonhumans 
accomplish, and what rights accompany this labor? Is the construction of an anthill a mixing of 
labor with nature to create property? What of beaver dams? Is there a line between mixing labor 
with nature and simply survival? Are human labor and nonhuman labor similar concepts, or 
completely different in praxis? These questions demand critical examination in light of the 
arguments of ecological libertarianism, and do not find room in our current analysis.  
 Additionally, the arguments of ecological libertarianism bring stark demands on the 
libertarian conception of the free-market. Rothbard cements laissez-faire capitalism as a 
cornerstone of libertarianism153; it remains today an essential component and logical 
consequence of libertarian theory. What does ecological libertarianism mean for this necessary 
bulwark? As discussed earlier, the trafficking and captivity of nonhumans must end completely 
in the ecological libertarian society. Is this the end of capitalism? Hardly. Just as the ending of 
slavery did not halt the larger free-market, the acknowledgment of nonhuman moral standing 
will not either. However, it will stand in direct contrast to all other forms of libertarianism; green 
libertarianism, which aims to solve environmental problems through capitalism, will particularly 
be juxtaposed. For by expanding the moral community to include nonhumans, we are essentially 
removing them from the market. While this is a large portion of the contemporary market, it 
doesn’t necessarily remove individuals’ ability to trade in other natural resources. However, 
following the previous discussion, this trade would have to be constrained somewhat to 
recognize either nonhumans’ communal right to resources or nonhuman labor and property. In 
                                                
 




this way, ecological libertarianism counters the claims of green libertarianism and other forms of 
free-market environmentalism154, by twisting the traditional logic of those theories; whereas 
green libertarianism and free-market environmentalism generally claim to solve environmental 
problems via privatizing the environment, ecological libertarianism concurs and extends such 
privatization to include nonhumans as holders of property themselves.  
 The environmental implications of ecological libertarianism are interesting. Although we 
drew the analytic border between nonhumans and plants, for management of analytic scope, this 
border could (and should) be critically examined within the libertarian framework. In the 
meantime, we can find an interesting path to environmentalism through consideration of 
nonhuman property rights and concerns. If we cannot sell livestock, for example, we will remove 
pollution associated with the trade. Similarly, if we cannot sell the property of nonhumans then 
we likely will be restrained, to a degree dependent upon the conceptualization of nonhuman 
property, as to what natural resources we can sell. Of immediate interest is whether, for example, 
the planting of trees by squirrels or the pollination of plants by bees creates a system of property 
rights encapsulating the globe and destroying any trade of the most utilized resources in society. 
While likely not extending so far, the implications of ecological libertarianism vis-à-vis the 
environment are widespread and will bring previously unconsidered arguments and frameworks 
to the academic table.  
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At the onset of our discussion, there was great concern about the judicial claims of a captive 
possum in Pawnee, Indiana. As Leslie Knope attempted to seek a resolution for the question of 
the possum’s guilt, she found no assistance and no framework through which to contemplate the 
situation. Nonetheless, she found the possum as carrying judicial claims and rights (to some 
degree) that protected it from wanton destruction. Similarly, the question of the goring ox 
identified the cosmological and political presuppositions and consequences that surrounded the 
allotment of culpability. Considering the arguments encountered within our discussion, we are 
left with guidance as to how to perceive these questions. As for Leslie’s possum, there should 
have been no trial or judicial considerations. The possum was wanted for biting a dog, making 
the matter one of inter-nonhuman violence that humans should not (and logically cannot) enter. 
As for the goring ox, the question of who is culpable is somewhat a nonstarter. The farmer 
should not have enslaved the ox for labor to begin with.  
 Our discussion has hit many points, and libertarians of different leanings will likely come 
together in their rejection of it. It is my hope they do, and that from such combat libertarians will 
construct stronger arguments in the search for individual liberty. As this project comes to a quick 
close, I wish to leave by questioning broadly the goals of Man vis-à-vis the remainder of 
existence. After climbing the arduous hills of evolutionary, social, cultural, and technological 
development, why can we be so quick to ignore the plight of those still climbing? When 
inevitably we sit as gods atop our mastery of the physical world, will we rein as despots and 
malevolent authoritarians, or will we lead as libertarians those still struggling to find the light of 
liberty? To dominate those in progress is to deny the very freedom libertarianism fights to create; 
forceful rule over the weak is the historical trend which libertarians have since the onset 
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